Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  5 |           is a phrase signifying a thing’s essence. It is rendered
  2      I,  5 |       render the definition of the thing in question, because a definition
  3      I,  5 |          indicate the essence of a thing, but yet belongs to that
  4      I,  5 |            but yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated
  5      I,  5 |        That is to say, if any such thing were actually to be called
  6      I,  5 |              The question, "Is one thing in the same genus as another
  7      I,  5 |           genus yet belongs to the thing: (something which may possibly
  8      I,  5 |          any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) the "sitting
  9      I,  5 |           belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also "whiteness",
 10      I,  5 |        nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time white,
 11      I,  6 |            for this is not an easy thing to find, and, even were
 12      I,  7 |         than one name but only one thing, e.g. "doublet" and "cloak";
 13      I,  7 |       where there is more than one thing, but they present no differences
 14      I,  8 |      predicated convertibly of the thing, it either is or is not
 15      I,  15|             for whenever we call a thing an "engine", we do not call
 16      I,  18|          their minds upon the same thing: whereas when once it has
 17      I,  18|    recognizing what any particular thing is. That it helps us in
 18      I,  18|           us in recognizing what a thing is, because we usually distinguish
 19      I,  18|         essence of each particular thing by means of the differentiae
 20     II,  1 |            an extremely precarious thing; for in the case of accidents
 21     II,  1 |            an attribute belongs to thing which does not belong to
 22     II,  2 |       definition and property of a thing belong to it and to nothing
 23     II,  3 |        involved. Further, that one thing is, or is not, "of" another
 24     II,  3 |         science is of a particular thing, treated either as an end
 25     II,  3 |           being doctored), or as a thing desired accidentally, as,
 26     II,  4 |      attributes belong to the same thing, look at its genus; e.g.
 27     II,  4 |           real or apparent, of the thing before you, and if one is
 28     II,  4 |           and see in regard to the thing in question, what it is
 29     II,  4 |      conditions the reality of the thing in question, or what it
 30     II,  4 |         necessarily follows if the thing in question be real: if
 31     II,  4 |         reality the reality of the thing in question will follow (
 32     II,  4 |         shown to be real, then the thing in question will also have
 33     II,  4 |          it is that is real if the thing in question be real, for
 34     II,  4 |         that what follows from the thing in question is unreal, we
 35     II,  4 |          shall have demolished the thing in question.~Moreover, look
 36     II,  6 |      necessity nor usually. If the thing happens usually, then even
 37     II,  6 |            also if he has stated a thing to be an accident of itself,
 38     II,  6 |        taking it to be a different thing because it has a different
 39     II,  6 |        these are names of the same thing, to wit, Pleasure. If then
 40     II,  7 | disposition: and one objectionable thing is not generally thought
 41     II,  7 |     Moreover, if the accident of a thing have a contrary, see whether
 42     II,  7 |          the same time to the same thing.~Or again, look and see
 43     II,  7 |          necessarily belong to the thing: e.g. if he has said that
 44     II,  7 |     contrary as well: for the same thing admits of contraries. Thus (
 45     II,  7 |          For having shown that the thing in question will not admit
 46     II,  7 |      contrary belongs, or that the thing is capable of the contrary,
 47     II,  9 |           will "just", of a man or thing, and "justly" connote something
 48     II,  9 |    generation and destruction of a thing, and at the things which
 49     II,  10|          the case of some one like thing, it is so with the other
 50     II,  10|          alike as regards a single thing and a number of things:
 51     II,  10|  discrepancy. Thus, if to "know" a thing be to "think of" it, then
 52     II,  10|           that dealt with a single thing, viz. that to "know" a thing
 53     II,  10|       thing, viz. that to "know" a thing is to "think of" it.~Moreover,
 54     II,  11|           from the addition of one thing to another. If the addition
 55     II,  11|             If the addition of one thing to another makes that other
 56     II,  11|            white or good, then the thing added will be white or good-it
 57     II,  11|          it had as given, then the thing added will itself as well
 58     II,  11|    overthrowing a view. For if the thing added does not make the
 59     II,  11|           good or white: for a bad thing will never be said to have
 60     II,  11|        possible for a destructible thing to escape destruction at
 61     II,  11|         same way also it is a good thing at certain places to follow
 62     II,  11|            though it is not a good thing absolutely. Moreover, in
 63     II,  11|         certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g.
 64     II,  11|            one be in that state. A thing is "absolutely" so which
 65    III,  1 |         the property of the better thing is better than the property
 66    III,  2 |           we do not need the other thing, is more desirable than
 67    III,  2 |        contraries of things; for a thing whose loss or whose contrary
 68    III,  2 |          is more like than another thing to something better than
 69    III,  2 |            is more like the better thing while another is more like
 70    III,  3 |        desirable.~Moreover, if one thing makes good whatever it touches,
 71    III,  3 |            cases.~Moreover, if one thing exceeds while the other
 72    III,  3 |     Moreover, when the excess of a thing is more desirable than the
 73    III,  3 |            of something else, that thing is itself also more desirable
 74    III,  3 |          addition of A to the same thing as B makes the whole more
 75    III,  3 |            saw is a more desirable thing, but it is not a more desirable
 76    III,  3 |            is not a more desirable thing without qualification. Again,
 77    III,  3 |            qualification. Again, a thing is more desirable if, when
 78    III,  3 |            of subtraction: for the thing upon whose subtraction the
 79    III,  3 |          lesser good.~Also, if one thing be desirable for itself,
 80    III,  3 |        e.g.) health than beauty. A thing is defined as being desired
 81    III,  3 |        look of it, while the other thing is desirable on the one
 82    III,  3 |       better and more desirable. A thing may be taken to be more
 83    III,  3 |          argue by showing that the thing in question is in like measure
 84    III,  3 | objectionable and desirable: for a thing of such a character that
 85    III,  4 |         subtract the excess of one thing over another. For if what
 86    III,  5 |            by nature. Also, if one thing does, and another does not,
 87    III,  5 |            if in any character one thing exceeds and another falls
 88    III,  5 |            clearly the first-named thing exhibits that character
 89    III,  5 |           A when added to the same thing as B imparts to the whole
 90    III,  5 |             or if, when added to a thing which exhibits that character
 91    III,  5 |        means of subtraction: for a thing upon whose subtraction the
 92    III,  6 |      demolishing or establishing a thing universally we also show
 93    III,  6 |   co-ordinates and inflexions of a thing: for public opinion grants
 94    III,  6 |        some cases an objectionable thing. On the same principle,
 95    III,  6 |            some cases a beneficial thing. The case is the same also
 96    III,  6 |           is in some cases an evil thing. Likewise, also, if the
 97    III,  6 |            be in some cases a good thing or its production an evil
 98    III,  6 |          or its production an evil thing, then knowledge will be
 99    III,  6 |           be in some cases an evil thing; e.g. if for a man to forget
100    III,  6 |      disgraceful conduct be a good thing, and to remember it be an
101    III,  6 |          to remember it be an evil thing, then the knowledge of his
102    III,  6 |         may be taken to be an evil thing. The same holds also in
103     IV,  1 |           to the same genus as the thing mentioned, and see whether
104     IV,  1 |           For it is possible for a thing to be and not to be self-moved,
105     IV,  1 |    attribute which can belong to a thing and also not belong.~Moreover,
106     IV,  1 |    specifically different from the thing in question; or, if your
107     IV,  2 |           for the differentia of a thing is never its genus. And
108     IV,  2 |            is true is clear: for a thing’s differentia never signifies
109     IV,  2 |             colour" (e.g.) to be a thing that "pierces", or "number"
110     IV,  2 |            pierces", or "number" a thing that is "odd". Also, see
111     IV,  3 |          for in that case the same thing will at the same time partake
112     IV,  4 |        noble" and a kind of "good" thing, and yet, while "virtue"
113     IV,  4 |            of" and "multiple of" a thing. Likewise, also, in the
114     IV,  5 |         for it is impossible for a thing still to remain the same
115     IV,  5 |            be anywhere in the same thing: for what contains the species
116     IV,  5 |          are not found in the same thing: for shame is found in the "
117     IV,  5 |         are both found in the same thing, so that if they do not
118     IV,  5 |          do not appear in the same thing, clearly it is not an accident.~
119     IV,  5 |     capacity is always a desirable thing: for even the capacities
120     IV,  5 |       vehemence" and "excess" of a thing are found in a thing which
121     IV,  5 |          of a thing are found in a thing which is thus vehement and
122     IV,  5 |     excessive: for there is such a thing as a vehement conviction:
123     IV,  5 |    Likewise, also, there is such a thing as excessive astonishment:
124     IV,  5 |          knower or motion a moving thing.~Sometimes, too, people
125     IV,  6 |       motion" or "a form of moving thing". For the same soul is usually
126     IV,  6 |         rendering the essence of a thing it is more fitting to state
127     IV,  6 |        does not describe a walking thing of a certain quality.~The
128     IV,  6 |        always follows along with a thing, and is not convertible
129      V,  1 |        render this property of one thing and deny it of another,
130      V,  1 |         one which is rendered of a thing in comparison with everything
131      V,  1 |         and distinguishes the said thing from everything else, as
132      V,  1 |         from a particular definite thing, as does the property which
133      V,  1 |       comparison with every single thing that is, so that if the
134      V,  1 |      whether it belongs to the one thing and not to the other: on
135      V,  2 |            signifies more than one thing. For then the property will
136      V,  2 |            signifies more than one thing, viz. (1) to possess sensation, (
137      V,  2 |        kind" mean one and the same thing. For he will have repeated
138      V,  2 |           one property of the same thing, without a definite proviso
139      V,  2 |           one property of the same thing, and has rendered one only:
140      V,  3 |         surface to be "the primary thing that is coloured", has introduced
141      V,  3 |      stated: for the property of a thing ought not to show its essence.
142      V,  4 |           this, that then the same thing will be the property of
143      V,  4 |            different. For the same thing has quite a number of specifically
144      V,  4 |      something that is said of the thing in question alone, and is
145      V,  4 |          purposes, see if the same thing fails to be a property of
146      V,  4 |        other hand, see if the same thing be a property of something
147      V,  4 |       property that belongs to one thing and that only. For an attribute
148      V,  4 |           the subject as being one thing in itself, and another thing
149      V,  4 |       thing in itself, and another thing when combined with its accident,
150      V,  4 |         example, that "man" is one thing, and white man’ another,
151      V,  4 |      though it is called "another" thing because the mode of being
152      V,  4 |             for it is not the same thing for a man to be a man and
153      V,  5 |          be predicated also of the thing that is so called after
154      V,  5 |        render as the property of a thing something that belongs to
155      V,  5 |           or one that belongs to a thing only as called after something
156      V,  5 |           faculty", or because the thing is in a certain state, as "
157      V,  5 |          may fail to belong to the thing to which it naturally belongs,
158      V,  5 |         not shown that he states a thing to be such and such primarily,
159      V,  5 |           rendered a property to a thing either because that thing
160      V,  5 |          thing either because that thing possesses a state, or because
161      V,  5 |       property belongs because the thing partakes of, or is partaken
162      V,  5 |             see if he has stated a thing as a property of itself:
163      V,  5 |           not be a property. For a thing itself always shows its
164      V,  5 |            has avoided rendering a thing as a property of itself,
165      V,  7 |            impossible for the same thing to be a property of more
166      V,  8 |            impossible for the same thing to be a property of more
167      V,  8 |          property of more than one thing.~Fourthly (d) for destructive
168     VI,  2 |         rendered: and this kind of thing is particularly easy in
169     VI,  3 |           not absolutely the first thing to come off the food, but
170     VI,  3 |            if he has said the same thing more than once, saying (
171     VI,  3 |       predicated twice of the same thing; but as a matter of fact
172     VI,  3 |           twice, but when the same thing is more than once predicated
173     VI,  3 |        over again he says the same thing twice over. Likewise, too,
174     VI,  3 |           so that he says the same thing more than once.~
175     VI,  4 |     Whether, then, a man defines a thing correctly or incorrectly
176     VI,  4 |         one definition of the same thing: for clearly he who defines
177     VI,  4 |            definitions of the same thing, the essence of the object
178     VI,  4 |          one who has not defined a thing through terms that are prior
179     VI,  4 |           so happens that the same thing is more intelligible both
180     VI,  4 |           definition must define a thing through its genus and its
181     VI,  4 |    definitions of one and the same thing. For, as it happens, different
182     VI,  5 |         one definition of the same thing. It is only, however, in
183     VI,  5 |            the best.~Again, if the thing in question be not placed
184     VI,  5 |      essence: for the essence of a thing must in each case bring
185     VI,  5 |          its genus. It is the same thing if the object be not put
186     VI,  6 |          with the differentia of a thing are all true of the genus
187     VI,  6 |          of the genus to which the thing belongs. Likewise, also,
188     VI,  6 |    privations. For "blind" means a thing which cannot see when its
189     VI,  6 |            principle that the same thing cannot be in two genera
190     VI,  6 |           for the differentia of a thing cannot both belong and not
191     VI,  6 |            as the differentia of a thing’s essence: for the general
192     VI,  6 |           quality: for even if the thing be on the dry land, still
193     VI,  6 |        subverts the essence of the thing, while the differentia is
194     VI,  6 |        absolutely impossible for a thing to exist without its own
195     VI,  6 |         lay down absolutely that a thing cannot have as its differentia
196     VI,  6 |      function. The definition of a thing’s natural function is "that
197     VI,  6 |          deals specially with that thing".~Or see if, whenever a
198     VI,  6 |          be wise.~Moreover, if the thing of which the term defined
199     VI,  6 |            the differentia and the thing defined: e.g. supposing
200     VI,  6 |            be defined as a "living thing immune at present from destruction".
201     VI,  6 |         destruction". For a living thing that is immune "at present"
202     VI,  6 |           may mean either that the thing has not been destroyed at
203     VI,  6 |         then, we say that a living thing is at present immune from
204     VI,  6 |          it is at present a living thing of such a kind as never
205     VI,  7 |        equal.~Moreover, see if the thing admits of degrees, whereas
206     VI,  7 |        admits of degrees while the thing does not. For either both
207     VI,  7 |      definition is the same as the thing. Moreover, see if, while
208     VI,  7 |             had they been the same thing.~Moreover, suppose two things
209     VI,  7 |        more applicable to the same thing, if they had been the same.
210     VI,  7 |         acting". For then the same thing will be both beautiful and
211     VI,  7 |           to the ears" is the same thing as "not beautiful". If,
212     VI,  7 |            show also that the same thing is both real and unreal.~
213     VI,  8 |          to be rendered either the thing to which the term itself
214     VI,  9 |           in a sense more than one thing: for in defining knowledge,
215     VI,  9 |           has failed to render the thing in which it is primarily
216     VI,  10|            to mean not one kind of thing only, but to be one thing
217     VI,  10|          thing only, but to be one thing in animals and another in
218     VI,  10|        always used to describe one thing only, and therefore to render
219     VI,  12|          be a science of some real thing, but not of another, it
220     VI,  12|         way to render account of a thing be to render it as it is
221     VI,  12|        used in relation not to one thing but to a number of things.
222     VI,  12|          is no reason why the same thing should not be both real
223     VI,  12|         for their object some real thing, so that each will be a
224     VI,  12|       again, people define not the thing but only the thing in a
225     VI,  12|         not the thing but only the thing in a good or perfect condition.
226     VI,  12|             and it is better for a thing to be desirable in itself
227     VI,  13|         occurrence of this kind of thing in other cases also (for
228     VI,  13|           is not the same, but one thing in the case of the whole
229     VI,  13|    impossible either for a neutral thing to produce something good
230     VI,  13|           bad to produce a neutral thing. Or again, see if the one
231     VI,  13|           Or again, see if the one thing is more distinctly good
232     VI,  13|          is not enough to make the thing intelligible. For the essence
233     VI,  13|            essence of any compound thing is not merely that it is
234     VI,  13|         object as "A+B", the first thing to be said is that "A+B"
235     VI,  13|      different senses in which one thing may be said to be "+" another,
236     VI,  13|           either in some identical thing capable of containing them (
237     VI,  13|            to occur "because of" a thing is not the same as to occur "+
238     VI,  13|          the same as to occur "+ a thing" in any of its aforesaid
239     VI,  14|       Again, if in the nature of a thing two contraries are equally
240     VI,  14|           liable to occur, and the thing has been defined through
241     VI,  14|         one definition of the same thing; for how is it any more
242     VI,  14|         one definition of the same thing.~In combating definitions
243    VII,  1 |     opposition. For it is the same thing to take the opposite of
244    VII,  1 | destruction, and in general of any thing that is related in like
245    VII,  1 |         greatest’ apply but to one thing.’ Likewise also in other
246    VII,  1 |         greatest" must be a single thing, if it is to be proved to
247    VII,  1 |          both the same as the same thing, clearly neither are they
248    VII,  1 |       addition of each to the same thing fails to make the same whole;
249    VII,  1 |            subtraction of the same thing from each leaves a different
250    VII,  1 |            have signified the same thing: but they do not; for "double"
251    VII,  1 |            do not signify the same thing.~Inquire also not only if
252    VII,  3 |           establish one, the first thing to observe is that few if
253    VII,  3 |      statement that to reason to a thing’s definition and essence
254    VII,  3 |      signifying the essence of the thing and the predicates contained
255    VII,  3 |        which are predicated of the thing in the category of essence;
256    VII,  3 |    anything else predicated of the thing in the category of essence.~
257    VII,  3 |         and other opposites of the thing, surveying the expressions
258    VII,  3 |      rendered; for if the contrary thing be found in the contrary
259    VII,  3 |            the definition, and the thing before you is not in that
260    VII,  3 |           the decomposition of the thing’s essence, then to be destroyed
261    VII,  3 |           two definitions with one thing; for there cannot possibly
262    VII,  3 |          things or two of the same thing.~
263    VII,  5 |         well are predicated of the thing in the category of essence,
264    VII,  5 |        indicating the essence of a thing. The point is clear also
265    VII,  5 |          also to the property of a thing. For in establishing a property
266    VII,  5 |        clear also that the easiest thing of all is to overthrow a
267    VII,  5 |       attribute must belong to the thing in question, yet the genus
268    VII,  5 |       indicates the essence of the thing; and this has to be done
269    VII,  5 |           its subject.~The easiest thing of all to establish is an
270    VII,  5 |           predicate is the hardest thing to overthrow, because it
271   VIII,  1 |     induction, but is not the same thing; for in induction it is
272   VIII,  1 |            instance of the kind of thing meant is the distinction
273   VIII,  2 |          dispute, and say that the thing advanced does not answer
274   VIII,  2 |      happen to be the one and only thing of the kind, as for instance
275   VIII,  2 |     objection not in regard to the thing itself, but in regard to
276   VIII,  2 |         homonym, but to the actual thing asserted, the questioner
277   VIII,  2 |            lost his knowledge of a thing has forgotten it, because
278   VIII,  2 |       forgotten it, because if the thing alters, he has lost knowledge
279   VIII,  2 |      forgotten it. Accordingly the thing to do is to withdraw the
280   VIII,  2 |           have lost knowledge of a thing while it still remains,
281   VIII,  2 |       health, which is a less good thing than vigour, has a greater
282   VIII,  2 |            who keeps on asking one thing for a long time is a bad
283   VIII,  3 |           discuss it. This sort of thing happens particularly in
284   VIII,  3 |            rendered: e.g. "Has one thing one contrary or many?":
285   VIII,  3 |           is possible for the same thing to have several contraries
286   VIII,  5 |         good and evil are the same thing, as Heraclitus says," refuse
287   VIII,  5 |          the same time to the same thing; not because they do not
288   VIII,  5 |            has to say so. The same thing is done also by those who
289   VIII,  7 |    expression covers more than one thing, it is easy to disagree.
290   VIII,  12|             Clearly then the first thing to ask in regard to the
291   VIII,  13|     expression, that mean the same thing. A second way occurs whenever
292   VIII,  13|     antithesis, e.g. that the same thing is good and evil; thirdly,
293   VIII,  14|         knowledge of more than one thing": for that is the case with
294   VIII,  14|    parallel cases; for this is the thing in which they are respectively
295   VIII,  14|           objection is to make one thing into many; for the objector