Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |          does not fall within the definition; he does not assume opinions
  2      I,  1 |         purpose to give the exact definition of any of them; we merely
  3      I,  4 |          indicates the essence a "definition", while of the remainder
  4      I,  4 |         namely either property or definition or genus or accident. Do
  5      I,  4 |         walks on two feet" is the definition of man, is it not?"or ""
  6      I,  4 |         that walks on two feet" a definition of man or no?" [or "Is "
  7      I,  5 |         We must now say what are "definition", "property", "genus", and "
  8      I,  5 |        genus", and "accident". A "definition" is a phrase signifying
  9      I,  5 |         clearly do not render the definition of the thing in question,
 10      I,  5 |      thing in question, because a definition is always a phrase of a
 11      I,  5 |         shall have demolished the definition. Observe, please, that the
 12      I,  5 |         not enough to establish a definition. To show, however, that
 13      I,  5 |          foregoing-i.e. neither a definition nor a property nor a genus
 14      I,  5 |         it, to know already what "definition" and "genus" and "property"
 15      I,  6 |         the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus, or
 16      I,  6 |         shall have demolished the definition; so that, to use the phrase
 17      I,  7 |         to an alternative name or definition, as when a cloak is said
 18      I,  8 |        was formed either from the definition of something or from its
 19      I,  8 |      convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies
 20      I,  8 |  signifies the essence, it is the definition; if not, it is a property:
 21      I,  8 |        the terms contained in the definition of the subject: and if it
 22      I,  8 |      differentia, inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae;
 23      I,  8 |          without being either its definition or its genus or a property.~
 24      I,  9 |        and genus and property and definition of anything will always
 25      I,  10|                 10~First, then, a definition must be given of a "dialectical
 26      I,  14|          not easily rendered in a definition, but we have to try to recognize
 27      I,  15|           and the engine. For the definition of them that corresponds
 28      I,  15|          of raven, and also their definition. But in the case of genera
 29      I,  15|        useful also to look at the definition that arises from the use
 30      I,  18|         is useful for purposes of definition, e.g. the sameness of a
 31     II,  1 |          drawn from the elements "definition" and "property" and "genus"
 32     II,  2 |           often even without such definition it is obvious that he has
 33     II,  2 |          on both the name and the definition of their genera. A man therefore
 34     II,  2 |         as its property or as its definition: for the definition and
 35     II,  2 |           its definition: for the definition and property of a thing
 36     II,  2 |   familiar term: for often if the definition be rendered whole, the point
 37     II,  2 |          of the terms used in the definition a definition be stated,
 38     II,  2 |          used in the definition a definition be stated, it becomes obvious.~
 39     II,  4 |        people when committed to a definition: for an attack is always
 40    III,  5 |           a greater degree of the definition proper to the given character;
 41    III,  5 |      given character; e.g. if the definition of "white" be "a colour
 42    III,  6 |         good, without any further definition. For if he meant that a
 43     IV,  1 |         should take a look at the definition of Accident, and see whether
 44     IV,  1 |          defined as "to admit the definition of that which is partaken.
 45     IV,  1 |        for the species admits the definition of the genus, whereas the
 46     IV,  1 |   predicated, and therefore their definition as well.~Moreover, see if
 47     IV,  2 |        fusion", or, as in Plato’s definition,’ "locomotion" to be the
 48     IV,  5 |            yet we should accept a definition of the kind, not about all
 49      V,  3 |       whether he has rendered the definition as a property: for then
 50      V,  4 |            without being either a definition or a differentia: for then
 51      V,  4 |           neither differentia nor definition of its subject, and so "
 52      V,  5 |           is not a property but a definition. Thus (e.g.) he who has
 53     VI,  1 |          term is applied (for the definition of Man ought to be true
 54     VI,  1 |        genus (for the framer of a definition should first place the object
 55     VI,  1 |           all the elements of the definition the genus is usually supposed
 56     VI,  1 |          we said above as well, a definition ought to be peculiar): or
 57     VI,  1 |   language (for the language of a definition ought to be the very clearest
 58     VI,  1 |        all additional matter in a definition is superfluous. Again, each
 59     VI,  2 |           meaning intended by the definition involves an ambiguity with
 60     VI,  2 |        clear to which of them the definition rendered applies, and one
 61     VI,  2 |  objection on the ground that the definition does not apply to all the
 62     VI,  2 |           to all the things whose definition he has rendered: and this
 63     VI,  2 |          the term rendered in the definition, and then institute his
 64     VI,  2 |        its literal sense: for the definition stated will not apply to
 65     VI,  2 |           the expression used the definition of the contrary be not clear;
 66     VI,  3 |                   3~If, then, the definition be not clear, you should
 67     VI,  3 |          hand, he has phrased the definition redundantly, first of all
 68     VI,  3 |         of the term. Thus, in the definition of man, the addition "capable
 69     VI,  3 |       instance, would also be the definition of the soul, assuming it
 70     VI,  3 |         e.g.) it is said that the definition of phlegm is the "undigested
 71     VI,  3 |       undigested’ is left out the definition will still be peculiar to
 72     VI,  3 |          stated the other way the definition would not be true unless
 73     VI,  3 |         anything contained in the definition fails to apply to everything
 74     VI,  3 |         species: for this sort of definition is worse than those which
 75     VI,  3 |        pleasant". Accordingly our definition of desire becomes "conation-for-the-pleasant":
 76     VI,  3 |        contemplates reality:’ for definition is a certain type of contemplation,
 77     VI,  4 |         he has failed to make the definition through terms that are prior
 78     VI,  4 |            For the reason why the definition is rendered is to make known
 79     VI,  4 |       there will be more than one definition of the same thing: for clearly
 80     VI,  4 |    intelligible has also framed a definition, and a better one, so that
 81     VI,  4 |         all.~The statement that a definition has not been made through
 82     VI,  4 |       absolutely, since a correct definition must define a thing through
 83     VI,  4 |           all; and so a different definition would have to be rendered
 84     VI,  4 |       each several person, if the definition is to be constructed from
 85     VI,  4 |        that those who hold that a definition ought to be rendered through
 86     VI,  4 |           have to render the same definition at all times even to the
 87     VI,  4 |        only in this way could the definition come always to be one and
 88     VI,  4 |     requires. The demolition of a definition will most surely win a general
 89     VI,  4 |        occurs if we find that the definition has been rendered of what
 90     VI,  4 |            and accordingly in the definition of the one the other too
 91     VI,  4 |         exchange the word for its definition, e.g. the definition of "
 92     VI,  4 |          its definition, e.g. the definition of "day" as the "passage
 93     VI,  5 |          the expression, e.g. the definition of "body" as "that which
 94     VI,  5 |         three dimensions", or the definition of "man", supposing any
 95     VI,  5 |         first of the terms in the definition.~Moreover, see if, while
 96     VI,  5 |           should be more than one definition of the same thing. It is
 97     VI,  6 |           without breadth" is the definition of a species, as also is "
 98     VI,  6 |        differentia constitute the definition of the species. Hence the
 99     VI,  6 |          genus would admit of the definition of its species. Likewise,
100     VI,  6 |        also, it will admit of the definition of the differentia, seeing
101     VI,  6 |         its natural function. The definition of a thing’s natural function
102     VI,  6 |         in character, too, is the definition of "health", say, as a "
103     VI,  6 |         rendered according to the definition belongs in the present only
104     VI,  7 |          something other than the definition rendered. Suppose (e.g.)
105     VI,  7 |        rendered. Suppose (e.g.) a definition of "justice" as the "ability
106     VI,  7 |         rendered according to the definition does not, or, vice versa,
107     VI,  7 |         rendered according to the definition admits of degrees while
108     VI,  7 |         rendered according to the definition is the same as the thing.
109     VI,  7 |          which the content of the definition is less applicable. Take,
110     VI,  7 |           Take, for instance, the definition of "fire" as the "body that
111     VI,  7 |   Moreover, see if he renders the definition relative to two things taken
112     VI,  8 |        its genus, see whether the definition fails to mention that to
113     VI,  8 |          letters": whereas in the definition there ought to be rendered
114     VI,  8 |   therefore, to have rendered the definition also accordingly. On the
115     VI,  9 |                9~Moreover, if the definition be of the state of anything,
116     VI,  9 |         the term has the opposite definition, whether (e.g.) the definition
117     VI,  9 |    definition, whether (e.g.) the definition of "half" is the opposite
118     VI,  9 |      contrary term will apply the definition that is contrary in some
119     VI,  9 |       rendered later could be the definition of the contrary of the term
120     VI,  9 |        defined: and therefore the definition originally rendered of the
121     VI,  9 |    defines is bound to use in his definition the very term he is defining;
122     VI,  9 |        the word we substitute its definition. For to say "inequality"
123     VI,  9 |     denote privation, but yet the definition of it be rendered in a manner
124     VI,  9 |        contrary of good" (for the definition of things that are contrary
125     VI,  9 |          good" is inherent in the definition of "evil". If, then, "good"
126     VI,  10|        the like inflexions in the definition apply to the like inflexions
127     VI,  10|           too and see whether the definition given will apply to the
128     VI,  10|          so; e.g. in the Platonic definition where he adds the word "
129     VI,  10|           not mortal, so that the definition will not fit the Idea. So
130     VI,  10|        acted upon" are added, the definition and the Idea are absolutely
131     VI,  10|          rendered a single common definition of terms that are used ambiguously.
132     VI,  10|      ambiguously. For terms whose definition corresponding their common
133     VI,  10|         synonymous; if, then, the definition applies in a like manner
134     VI,  10|        what happens to Dionysius’ definition of "life" when stated as "
135     VI,  10|           therefore to render the definition in this way on purpose:
136     VI,  10|            and wish to render the definition of the one sense only, and
137     VI,  10|        see that he has rendered a definition common to both senses instead
138     VI,  10|          were synonymous (for the definition of the one sense will not
139     VI,  10|          to a synonymous term the definition should apply in its full
140     VI,  10|          synonymous, whenever the definition rendered fails to apply
141     VI,  10|         ambiguous supposing their definition applies to both senses of
142     VI,  10|          is ambiguous because the definition he has rendered will not
143     VI,  10|         sense as well, see if the definition of this second meaning applies
144     VI,  10|       there will be more than one definition of those other meanings,
145     VI,  10|     senses, and, finding that his definition does not apply to them all,
146     VI,  10|          senses, just because his definition will not do so either, then
147     VI,  11|             11~Suppose now that a definition has been rendered of some
148     VI,  11|       complex term, take away the definition of one of the elements in
149     VI,  11|           if also the rest of the definition defines the rest of it:
150     VI,  11|       that neither does the whole definition define the whole complex.
151     VI,  11|         its extremes"; if now the definition of a finite line’ be the "
152     VI,  11|          extremes") ought to be a definition of straight’. But an infinite
153     VI,  11|       compound notion, see if the definition rendered be equimembral
154     VI,  11|          with the term defined. A definition is said to be equimembral
155     VI,  11|         of nouns and verbs in the definition. For the exchange in such
156     VI,  11|       than formerly; whereas in a definition terms ought to be rendered
157     VI,  11|          white man": for it is no definition, and moreover is less intelligible
158     VI,  11|          than of the genus that a definition should be rendered, seeing
159     VI,  11|           object of rendering the definition is to make the subject familiar;
160     VI,  11|            If he has rendered the definition of the differentia, see
161     VI,  11|      differentia, see whether the definition rendered is common to it
162     VI,  11|           with a middle", further definition is required of how it has
163     VI,  11|          that this could not be a definition of "odd". If, on the other
164     VI,  11|         will either discredit the definition or prove that it is no definition
165     VI,  11| definition or prove that it is no definition at all.~
166     VI,  12|           of which he renders the definition is a reality, whereas what
167     VI,  12|          what is contained in the definition is not, e.g. Suppose "white"
168     VI,  12|        anything that is real, the definition is clearly altogether false;
169     VI,  12|       moreover, impossible that a definition of this sort should be peculiar
170     VI,  12|    reality. Clearly, then, such a definition does not define any science
171     VI,  12|         any science at all; for a definition ought to be peculiar to
172     VI,  12|    perfect condition. Such is the definition of a rhetorician as "one
173     VI,  12|           this is rather what the definition too ought to have indicated.~
174     VI,  13|         defines it as and B’, the definition will be true of both and
175     VI,  13|          in question, clearly the definition rendered could not hold
176     VI,  13|           division at all, e.g. a definition of anger as "pain with a
177     VI,  14|       composition, as (e.g.) in a definition of "flesh" or "bone" as
178     VI,  14|       there will be more than one definition of the same thing; for how
179     VI,  14|          for how is it any more a definition to define it through this
180     VI,  14|          occur in it? Such is the definition of the soul, if defined
181     VI,  14|        when one cannot attack the definition as a whole for lack of acquaintance
182     VI,  14|   demolished, so too is the whole definition. Where, again, a definition
183     VI,  14|       definition. Where, again, a definition is obscure, one should first
184     VI,  14|           whatever it is that his definition means. Moreover, just as
185     VI,  14|       oneself to propose a second definition: for if it is seen to be
186     VI,  14|       object defined, clearly the definition already laid down will have
187     VI,  14|           cannot be more than one definition of the same thing.~In combating
188     VI,  14|         oneself a happy shot at a definition of the object before one,
189     VI,  14|          some correctly expressed definition. For one is bound, with
190     VI,  14|          in any features that the definition ought to have, and also
191    VII,  2 |       useful also in questions of definition, as was said before:’ for
192    VII,  2 |           rendered could not be a definition. None of the constructive
193    VII,  2 |            helps in the matter of definition; for it is not enough to
194    VII,  2 |    establish that the former is a definition, but a definition must have
195    VII,  2 |     former is a definition, but a definition must have also all the other
196    VII,  3 |         the attempt to demolish a definition should always be made. If,
197    VII,  3 |         in discussion arrive at a definition by reasoning: they always
198    VII,  3 |          to say accurately what a definition is, and how it should be
199    VII,  3 |       that to reason to a thing’s definition and essence is quite possible.
200    VII,  3 |          quite possible. For if a definition is an expression signifying
201    VII,  3 |           would of necessity be a definition; for it is impossible that
202    VII,  3 |         anything else should be a definition, seeing that there is not
203    VII,  3 |       category of essence.~That a definition may thus be reached by a
204    VII,  3 |       detail: for if the opposite definition defines that opposite term,
205    VII,  3 |           that opposite term, the definition given must of necessity
206    VII,  3 | contraries the one whose contrary definition seems most obvious. The
207    VII,  3 |       genus to that stated in the definition, and the thing before you
208    VII,  3 |      differentiae to those in the definition are predicated of the contrary
209    VII,  3 |        then those rendered in the definition would be predicated of the
210    VII,  3 |           given must be the right definition. It might be replied that
211    VII,  3 |        generally, seeing that the definition consists of genus and differentiae,
212    VII,  3 |          and differentiae, if the definition of the contrary term be
213    VII,  3 |    contrary term be apparent, the definition of the term before you will
214    VII,  3 |     contraries will have the same definition.~Moreover, look at it from
215    VII,  3 |        end, this will also be the definition of each of the rest as well.~
216    VII,  3 |         than B defines and B is a definition of so too is A of a. Further,
217    VII,  3 |           of no use when a single definition is compared with two things,
218    VII,  3 |      there cannot possibly be one definition of two things or two of
219    VII,  4 |       various species whether the definition applies. For the species
220    VII,  5 |     establish than to overthrow a definition, is obvious from considerations
221    VII,  5 |       that of the elements of the definition rendered the one is genus
222    VII,  5 |         impossible to reason to a definition; for if any other things
223    VII,  5 |          or some other one is its definition, for a definition is an
224    VII,  5 |          is its definition, for a definition is an expression indicating
225    VII,  5 |        many. Now in demolishing a definition it is sufficient to argue
226    VII,  5 |         shall have demolished the definition); whereas in establishing
227    VII,  5 |         whereas in establishing a definition, one is bound to bring people
228    VII,  5 |       everything contained in the definition is attributable. Moreover,
229    VII,  5 |        must be universal: for the definition put forward must be predicated
230    VII,  5 |   moreover be convertible, if the definition rendered is to be peculiar
231    VII,  5 |       process of overthrowing the definition. For merely to show that
232    VII,  5 |           merely to show that the definition fails to be predicated of
233    VII,  5 |          but not to it alone, the definition is thereby demolished.~The
234    VII,  5 |           rules that apply to the definition will apply also to the property
235    VII,  5 |      explained in the case of the definition. In regard to the genus,
236    VII,  5 |          of all is to overthrow a definition. For on account of the number
237    VII,  5 |           we are presented in the definition with the greatest number
238    VII,  5 |          as means for attacking a definition: for if either the formula
239    VII,  5 |       formula fail to belong, the definition is thereby demolished. On
240    VII,  5 |       other except in the case of definition. Clearly, then, it is the
241    VII,  5 |          all things to demolish a definition, while to establish one
242   VIII,  1 |        the universal premiss by a definition relating not to the precise
243   VIII,  1 |          themselves, whenever the definition is taken in regard to a
244   VIII,  1 |         the case, however, of the definition of "anger" it is not so
245   VIII,  3 |            For the former require definition, while the latter have to
246   VIII,  3 |         if the questioner makes a definition: and yet until it is clear
247   VIII,  3 |      every item of that sort by a definition. The inferences, too, that
248   VIII,  3 |      intractable, it either needs definition or else bears either several
249   VIII,  3 |        given position because the definition has not been correctly rendered:
250   VIII,  3 |        with other terms requiring definition. It appears also in mathematics
251   VIII,  3 |      sometimes due to a defect in definition; e.g. in proving that the
252   VIII,  3 |          the area; whereas if the definition be given, the fact asserted
253   VIII,  3 |        the sides: and this is the definition of "the same ratio". The
254   VIII,  3 |            on the other hand, the definition of the starting-points be
255   VIII,  9 |  maintaining either a thesis or a definition the answerer should try