Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  10|      opinion that one ought to do good to one’s friends, it will
  2      I,  10|          also, if one ought to do good to one’s friends, one ought
  3      I,  10|      friends, one ought not to do good to one’s enemies: this too
  4      I,  10|        being that one ought to do good to one’s enemies. Likewise,
  5      I,  10|           e.g. if one ought to do good to one’s friends, one ought
  6      I,  10|           appear also as if doing good to one’s friends were a
  7      I,  14|       separate headings, e.g. "On Good", or "On Life"-and that "
  8      I,  14|         or "On Life"-and that "On Good" should deal with every
  9      I,  14|           deal with every form of good, beginning with the category
 10      I,  14|            e.g. the knowledge of "good and evil", of "white and
 11      I,  15|           and courage are called "good" in one sense, and that
 12      I,  15|          term is ambiguous: e.g. "good" in the case of food means "
 13      I,  15|       certain time, as (e.g.) the good that happens at the right
 14      I,  15|          the right time is called good. Often it signifies what
 15      I,  15|       proper amount too is called good. So then the term "good"
 16      I,  15|           good. So then the term "good" is ambiguous. In the same
 17     II,  1 |        such as "Every pleasure is good" and "No pleasure is good";
 18     II,  1 |         good" and "No pleasure is good"; particular problems are
 19     II,  1 |         such as "Some pleasure is good" and "Some pleasure is not
 20     II,  1 |         and "Some pleasure is not good". The methods of establishing
 21     II,  2 |     injured. Again, to see if the good man is jealous, ask who
 22     II,  2 |  well-behaved person, clearly the good man is not jealous: for
 23     II,  2 |           at the successes of the good, and he is "indignant" who
 24     II,  4 |           if there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also
 25     II,  4 |         there is also a bad and a good disposition: for "disposition"
 26     II,  4 |        the genus; for if "man" is good, then animal also is good.
 27     II,  4 |         good, then animal also is good. On the other hand, for
 28     II,  5 |          a kind on which he has a good stock of lines of argument.
 29     II,  6 |         also the expression "of a good hope" may be taken to mean
 30     II,  6 |        mean the man who hopes for good things. Likewise also "well-starred"
 31     II,  6 |        mean the man whose star is good, as Xenocrates says "well-starred
 32     II,  6 |          are comparatively seldom good, so that his mistake is
 33     II,  6 |           has declared them to be good of necessity. The same is
 34     II,  6 |          into joy and delight and good cheer: for all these are
 35     II,  7 |       gives two modes: e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil
 36     II,  7 |         evil to friends and to do good to enemies. Or else (2)
 37     II,  7 |       gives two modes, e.g. to do good to friends and to do evil
 38     II,  7 |         evil to friends, or to do good to enemies and to do evil
 39     II,  7 |       gives two modes; e.g. to do good to friends and to do good
 40     II,  7 |         good to friends and to do good to enemies, or to do evil
 41     II,  7 |     contrariety; for the doing of good to friends is not contrary
 42     II,  7 |          contrary to the doing of good to enemies: for both of
 43     II,  7 |          a contrariety. For to do good to friends is contrary to
 44     II,  7 |        contrary. For the doing of good to friends has as its contrary
 45     II,  7 |        contrary both the doing of good to enemies and the doing
 46     II,  9 |     kindred series is shown to be good or praiseworthy, then all
 47     II,  9 |        predicate: e.g. argue that good is not necessarily pleasant;
 48     II,  9 |          of generation rank among good things, are themselves also
 49     II,  9 |       things, are themselves also good; and if they themselves
 50     II,  9 |         and if they themselves be good, so also are their modes
 51     II,  9 |      modes of destruction rank as good things, then they themselves
 52     II,  9 |          they themselves count as good. The same argument applies
 53     II,  9 |       whose productive causes are good, themselves also rank as
 54     II,  9 |           themselves also rank as good; whereas if causes destructive
 55     II,  9 |           destructive of them are good, they themselves rank as
 56     II,  10|      subject: e.g. if pleasure be good, see whether also a greater
 57     II,  10|     greater pleasure be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be
 58     II,  11|          another makes that other good or white, whereas formerly
 59     II,  11|      formerly it was not white or good, then the thing added will
 60     II,  11|           does not make the other good, it is not thereby made
 61     II,  11|           in itself it may not be good: for the addition of good
 62     II,  11|         good: for the addition of good to evil does not necessarily
 63     II,  11|        necessarily make the whole good, any more than the addition
 64     II,  11|        greater or less degrees of good or of white will not be
 65     II,  11|         attributed to what is not good or white: for a bad thing
 66     II,  11|       given respect people may be good by nature, e.g. they may
 67     II,  11|           absolutely they are not good by nature, because no one
 68     II,  11|         the same way also it is a good thing at certain places
 69     II,  11|         areas, though it is not a good thing absolutely. Moreover,
 70     II,  11|          at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines,
 71    III,  1 |          by the prudent or by the good man or by the right law,
 72    III,  1 |      right law, or by men who are good in any particular line,
 73    III,  1 |     things would choose, e.g. the good: for everything aims at
 74    III,  1 |        for everything aims at the good. You should direct the argument
 75    III,  1 |           falls within the genus "good", whereas the other does
 76    III,  1 |           the former is called "a good", whereas the latter is
 77    III,  1 |         is in itself the cause of good is more desirable than what
 78    III,  1 |        per accidens, the cause of good things), and so in other
 79    III,  1 |           accidens.~Also, what is good absolutely is more desirable
 80    III,  1 |       more desirable than what is good for a particular person,
 81    III,  1 |      operation; for the former is good absolutely, the latter only
 82    III,  1 |         operation. So too what is good by nature is more desirable
 83    III,  1 |           more desirable than the good that is not so by nature,
 84    III,  1 |          just man; for the one is good by nature, whereas in the
 85    III,  2 |           followed by the greater good is the more desirable: or,
 86    III,  2 |     Moreover, a greater number of good things is more desirable
 87    III,  2 |          possible for what is not good, together with what is,
 88    III,  2 |          than a greater number of good things, e.g. the combination
 89    III,  2 |       something else which is not good may be more desirable than
 90    III,  2 |        that what is nearer to the good is better and more desirable,
 91    III,  2 |         more nearly resembles the good: thus justice is better
 92    III,  2 |           and that Odysseus was a good man, though unlike Achilles.
 93    III,  2 |         that the more conspicuous good is more desirable than the
 94    III,  2 |          dealing and the doing of good rather than the semblance
 95    III,  2 |         we would rather really do good to our friends than seem
 96    III,  2 |        desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere
 97    III,  2 |        better than mere life, and good life is a superfluity, whereas
 98    III,  3 |      Moreover, if one thing makes good whatever it touches, while
 99    III,  3 |           degree, or if it render good the better and more important
100    III,  3 |   object-if (e.g.), the one makes good the soul, and the other
101    III,  3 |           of the same standard of good, the one which exceeds is
102    III,  3 |            when added to a lesser good, it makes the whole greater
103    III,  3 |           makes the whole greater good. Likewise, also, you should
104    III,  3 |         the remainder is a lesser good may be taken to be a greater
105    III,  3 |          be taken to be a greater good, whichever it be whose subtraction
106    III,  3 |      makes the remainder a lesser good.~Also, if one thing be desirable
107    III,  3 |          to pleasure and to being good.~Moreover, argue by showing
108    III,  4 |          whenever we call the one good "by nature" and the other "
109    III,  4 |       nature": for dearly what is good by nature is desirable.~
110    III,  6 |           that if all pleasure be good, then also all pain is evil,
111    III,  6 |          that if some pleasure be good, then also some pain is
112    III,  6 |           unjust be in some cases good, then also what is just
113    III,  6 |         unjustly is in some cases good. Also, if what is pleasant
114    III,  6 |        knowledge be in some cases good, then we may take it that
115    III,  6 |      knowledge be in some cases a good thing or its production
116    III,  6 |          disgraceful conduct be a good thing, and to remember it
117    III,  6 |         some form of knowledge be good in a greater degree than
118    III,  6 |           no form of knowledge is good, then you may take it that
119    III,  6 |           it that pleasure is not good either. Also, you should
120    III,  6 |       certain form of capacity be good in a like degree to knowledge,
121    III,  6 |       certain form of capacity be good, then so also is knowledge;
122    III,  6 |         if no form of capacity be good, then neither is knowledge.
123    III,  6 |       certain form of capacity be good in a less degree than knowledge,
124    III,  6 |       certain form of capacity be good, then so also is knowledge;
125    III,  6 |         if no form of capacity be good, there is no necessity that
126    III,  6 |        knowledge either should be good. Clearly, then, it is only
127    III,  6 |         some form of knowledge is good, then, suppose it to be
128    III,  6 |        shown that prudence is not good, neither will any other
129    III,  6 |    neither will any other kind be good, seeing that not even the
130    III,  6 |         asserted that pleasure is good or is not good, without
131    III,  6 |        pleasure is good or is not good, without any further definition.
132    III,  6 |          a particular pleasure is good, you must show universally
133    III,  6 |   universally that no pleasure is good, if the proposition in question
134    III,  6 |        particular pleasure is not good you must show universally
135    III,  6 |  universally that all pleasure is good: it is impossible to demolish
136    III,  6 |        particular pleasure is not good or is good, the proposition
137    III,  6 |        pleasure is not good or is good, the proposition in question
138    III,  6 |  universally that all pleasure is good, or whether we show that
139    III,  6 |          a particular pleasure is good, the proposition in question
140    III,  6 |        particular pleasure is not good, if we show that no pleasure
141    III,  6 |          show that no pleasure is good or that a particular pleasure
142    III,  6 |        particular pleasure is not good, we shall have produced
143    III,  6 |        particular pleasure is not good. If, on the other hand,
144    III,  6 |         particular pleasure to be good, while of some it is not:
145    III,  6 |           or that no pleasure, is good, the proposition in question
146    III,  6 |       only one single pleasure is good, it is possible to demolish
147    III,  6 |        more than one pleasure, is good, we shall have demolished
148     IV,  1 |          of an accident: e.g. if "good" be laid down to be the
149     IV,  1 |        particular pleasure be not good: for, if so, clearly good’
150     IV,  1 |         good: for, if so, clearly good’ is not the genus of pleasure:
151     IV,  1 |  knowledge’ is a relative, while "good" and "noble" are each a
152     IV,  1 |           each a quality, so that good, or noble, is not the genus
153     IV,  3 |          be itself a genus, e.g. "good": for if this be not found
154     IV,  3 |           happens in the case of "good" and "evil": for neither
155     IV,  3 |           is one between evil and good. Or see whether, though
156     IV,  3 |       found not in "evil" but in "good". Look and see also whether,
157     IV,  4 |         that of the useful to the good: for in each case the one
158     IV,  4 |  therefore pleasure be a kind of "good", then also the pleasant
159     IV,  4 |         taken to be productive of good, seeing that pleasure is
160     IV,  4 |           seeing that pleasure is good. In the same way also consider
161     IV,  4 |         the pleasant be a kind of good, what is not good is not
162     IV,  4 |         kind of good, what is not good is not pleasant. For were
163     IV,  4 |        were this no something not good as well would then be pleasant.
164     IV,  4 |         for it is impossible, if "good" be the genus of pleasant,
165     IV,  4 |       pleasant, that anything not good should be pleasant: for
166     IV,  4 |   examination: for if what is not good be not pleasant, then what
167     IV,  4 |          then what is pleasant is good, so that "good" is the genus
168     IV,  4 |        pleasant is good, so that "good" is the genus of "pleasant".~
169     IV,  4 |         of "noble" and a kind of "good" thing, and yet, while "
170     IV,  4 |      virtue" is a relative term, "good" and "noble" are not relatives
171     IV,  5 |     attends it, e.g. by defining "good temper" as the "control
172     IV,  5 | courageous" in the one case, and "good tempered" in the other;
173     IV,  5 |    respects: for even God and the good man are capable of doing
174     IV,  5 |         say that even God and the good man possess them; for they
175      V,  1 |       arguments both numerous and good to arise.~The so-called "
176      V,  3 |          that it is a property of good to be "the most direct opposite
177      V,  3 |          employed the opposite of good, and so the property of
178      V,  3 |            and so the property of good could not have been correctly
179      V,  3 |          what makes its possessor good" has rendered as property
180      V,  4 |     object of pursuit" to "appear good to certain persons", it
181      V,  4 |      desirable" either to "appear good to certain persons": for "
182      V,  6 |        lowest evil to the highest good, but "to be the highest
183      V,  6 |            but "to be the highest good" is not a property of "justice",
184      V,  6 |   inasmuch as evil is contrary to good, and objectionable to desirable,
185      V,  6 |      desirable" is a property of "good", "objectionable" would
186      V,  6 |       best" is a property of "the good", "worst" also will be a
187     VI,  4 |      through its opposite, e.g.i. good through evil: for opposites
188     VI,  4 |           into halves"", or ""the good" is a "state of virtue" ".
189     VI,  4 |          virtue also is a kind of good, so that the latter terms
190     VI,  4 |         virtue" employs the term "good", seeing that virtue is
191     VI,  4 |       virtue is a certain kind of good: likewise, also, whoever
192     VI,  6 |    differentia, e.g. "Virtue is a good or noble state: for "good"
193     VI,  6 |         good or noble state: for "good" is the genus of "virtue".
194     VI,  6 |         of "virtue". Or possibly "good" here is not the genus but
195     VI,  6 |          contains the other: for "good" does not include "state",
196     VI,  6 |            for not every state is good nor every good a "state".
197     VI,  6 |           state is good nor every good a "state". Both, then, could
198     VI,  6 |         genus of virtue, clearly "good" cannot be its genus: it
199     VI,  6 |       essence of virtue, whereas "good" indicates not the essence
200     VI,  8 |        wishing is "conation for a good". Likewise, also, if he
201     VI,  8 |           is a conation after the good", or "desire is a conation
202     VI,  8 |         of saying "the apparently good", or "pleasant". For often
203     VI,  8 |           do not perceive what is good or pleasant, so that their
204     VI,  8 |      their aim need not be really good or pleasant, but only apparently
205     VI,  8 |     wishing is for the absolutely good; they therefore cannot be
206     VI,  8 |         cannot be for an apparent good or an apparently pleasant:
207     VI,  9 |            useful"="productive of good", "injurious"=productive
208     VI,  9 |          evil" or "destructive of good", for one or the other of
209     VI,  9 |          the above, e.g. suppose "good" to be defined as "the contrary
210     VI,  9 |          will be "the contrary of good" (for the definition of
211     VI,  9 |          term being defined: for "good" is inherent in the definition
212     VI,  9 |  definition of "evil". If, then, "good" be the contrary of evil,
213     VI,  9 |       other than the "contrary of good", then "good" will be the "
214     VI,  9 |          contrary of good", then "good" will be the "contrary of
215     VI,  9 |       contrary of the contrary of good". Clearly, then, he has
216     VI,  12|           both real and white and good, so that it would be a correct
217     VI,  12|           but only the thing in a good or perfect condition. Such
218     VI,  12|            then the one will be a good rhetorician, and the other
219     VI,  12|      rhetorician, and the other a good thief: whereas it is not
220     VI,  13|        again, see if the whole be good or evil, and the parts neither,
221     VI,  13|       vice versa, if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither.
222     VI,  13|        thing to produce something good or bad, or for things good
223     VI,  13|        good or bad, or for things good or bad to produce a neutral
224     VI,  13|          thing is more distinctly good than the other is evil,
225     VI,  13|        yet the product be no more good than evil, e.g. suppose
226     VI,  13|          excess, and to be either good without qualification, or
227     VI,  13|   qualification, or at least more good than evil. Or it may be
228     VI,  13|          unless each be in itself good or bad; for many things
229     VI,  13|       that are productive are not good in themselves, but only
230     VI,  13|          or, per contra, they are good taken singly, and bad or
231     VI,  13|          that each taken alone is good, but if they are both administered
232     VI,  13|       compounded be in themselves good; if they are not, the whole
233     VI,  13|        whole may very well not be good, as in the cases just instanced.~
234    VII,  1 |       that the happy life and the good life are the same, seeing
235    VII,  1 |          of all forms of life the good life is the most desirable
236    VII,  1 |   numerically single, nor yet the good life, so that it does not
237    VII,  1 |          the same, the one being "good" and the other evil’, or
238    VII,  3 |          will mean "productive of good." For each of these things
239   VIII,  1 |          like cases fall.~It is a good rule also, occasionally
240   VIII,  2 |   statement that "the greater the good, the greater the evil that
241   VIII,  2 |           health, which is a less good thing than vigour, has a
242   VIII,  2 |            e.g. that "the greater good has the greater evil as
243   VIII,  2 |          opposite, unless the one good involves the other as well",
244   VIII,  2 |        How many meanings has "the good"?" For a dialectical premiss
245   VIII,  2 |     before expressing them, e.g. "Good means this, or this, does
246   VIII,  2 |         how many meanings of "the good" there are, whenever you
247   VIII,  4 |         what is the business of a good answerer, as of a good questioner.
248   VIII,  4 |          a good answerer, as of a good questioner. The business
249   VIII,  5 |      other’s opinions, e.g. that "good and evil are the same thing,
250   VIII,  9 |         e.g. that pleasure is the good, and that to do injustice
251   VIII,  13|       e.g. that the same thing is good and evil; thirdly, suppose
252   VIII,  14|          despair. Moreover, get a good stock of definitions: and
253   VIII,  14|         conclusion: but it is not good form. Wherefore the best