Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |     primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come
  2      I,  5 |      question, "Are sensation and knowledge the same or different?",
  3      I,  7 |          as when what can acquire knowledge is called the same as a
  4      I,  10|          general opinion that the knowledge of contraries is the same,
  5      I,  11|        avoidance, or to truth and knowledge, and that either by itself,
  6      I,  11|        know merely with a view to knowledge, e.g. whether the universe
  7      I,  13|            Sensation differs from knowledge in that the latter may be
  8      I,  14|       contraries is the same"-the knowledge of them being so-and "we
  9      I,  14|         are logical, e.g. "Is the knowledge of opposites the same or
 10      I,  14|         made into many. E.g. "The knowledge of opposites is the same";
 11      I,  14|          is the same"; next, "The knowledge of contraries is the same",
 12      I,  14|    division is possible, e.g. the knowledge of "good and evil", of "
 13      I,  15|       e.g. those of "animal" and "knowledge" (for the differentiae of
 14      I,  16|        does sensation differ from knowledge?: for in the case of genera
 15      I,  17|        being ‘A:B = C:D" (e.g. as knowledge stands to the object of
 16      I,  17|           stands to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related
 17     II,  2 |           a man has said that the knowledge of opposites is the same,
 18     II,  2 |         case it be shown that the knowledge of them is not the same
 19     II,  4 |         there is a bad and a good knowledge there is also a bad and
 20     II,  4 |      disposition" is the genus of knowledge. Now the former commonplace
 21     II,  4 |     anything the term "scientific knowledge" be applied, then also there
 22     II,  4 |         grammatical" or "musical" knowledge, or knowledge of one of
 23     II,  4 |            musical" knowledge, or knowledge of one of the other sciences;
 24     II,  4 |          one possesses scientific knowledge or is described by a term
 25     II,  4 |    possess grammatical or musical knowledge or knowledge of one of the
 26     II,  4 |           or musical knowledge or knowledge of one of the other sciences,
 27     II,  5 |           of acquiring reason and knowledge, so that by the demolition
 28     II,  7 |            it would be capable of knowledge as well: and this is not
 29     II,  7 |           of desire is capable of knowledge. For purposes, then, of
 30     II,  8 |          to a fraction. Again, if knowledge be a conceiving, then also
 31     II,  8 |           then also the object of knowledge is an object of conception;
 32     II,  8 |         sensation is an object of knowledge, whereas sensation is not
 33     II,  8 |          whereas sensation is not knowledge. The objection is, however,
 34     II,  8 |         people deny that there is knowledge of objects of sensation.
 35     II,  8 |     sensation is not an object of knowledge, on the ground that neither
 36     II,  8 |         that neither is sensation knowledge.~
 37     II,  9 |       former. Also, if justice be knowledge, then injustice is ignorance:
 38     II,  10|       case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more than one object,
 39    III,  6 |           some cases an object of knowledge, then also some form of
 40    III,  6 |        some form of conceiving is knowledge. Again, if what is unjust
 41    III,  6 |         that destroys pleasure or knowledge be in some cases good, then
 42    III,  6 |          take it that pleasure or knowledge is in some cases an evil
 43    III,  6 |       also, if the destruction of knowledge be in some cases a good
 44    III,  6 |    production an evil thing, then knowledge will be in some cases an
 45    III,  6 |           an evil thing, then the knowledge of his disgraceful conduct
 46    III,  6 |          it; e.g. if some form of knowledge be good in a greater degree
 47    III,  6 |        pleasure, while no form of knowledge is good, then you may take
 48    III,  6 |          good in a like degree to knowledge, and a certain form of capacity
 49    III,  6 |          be good, then so also is knowledge; while if no form of capacity
 50    III,  6 |          be good, then neither is knowledge. If, too, a certain form
 51    III,  6 |        good in a less degree than knowledge, and a certain form of capacity
 52    III,  6 |          be good, then so also is knowledge; but if no form of capacity
 53    III,  6 |         necessity that no form of knowledge either should be good. Clearly,
 54    III,  6 |      maintained that some form of knowledge is good, then, suppose it
 55    III,  6 |           alone of the virtues is knowledge, there are four ways of
 56    III,  6 |          shown that all virtue is knowledge, or that no virtue is so,
 57    III,  6 |       that prudence itself is not knowledge, the proposition in question
 58     IV,  1 |        snow" or of "swan". Again, knowledge’ is a relative, while "good"
 59     IV,  1 |        noble, is not the genus of knowledge. For the genera of relatives
 60     IV,  1 |   supposing "being" or "object of knowledge" were stated to be the genus
 61     IV,  1 |        that "being" or "object of knowledge" is not predicated of what
 62     IV,  1 |    neither "being" nor "object of knowledge" is the genus of "object
 63     IV,  2 |        one were to lay down that "knowledge" is the genus of justice.
 64     IV,  2 |        the remaining one, so that knowledge could not be the genus of
 65     IV,  2 |       prudence is both virtue and knowledge, and that neither of its
 66     IV,  2 |           admits that prudence is knowledge. If, however, any one were
 67     IV,  2 |          the case with virtue and knowledge. For both fall under the
 68     IV,  3 |           be a particular form of knowledge, then also "justly" is "
 69     IV,  3 |          the just man is a man of knowledge: whereas if any of these
 70     IV,  4 |        should be so as well: for "knowledge"is a relative term, but
 71     IV,  4 |           that of its genus: for "knowledge" is called knowledge "of
 72     IV,  4 |         for "knowledge" is called knowledge "of an object", whereas
 73     IV,  4 |   Likewise, also, in the case of "knowledge": for both knowledge’ itself
 74     IV,  4 |          of "knowledge": for both knowledge’ itself and its genera,
 75     IV,  4 |        same also as regards both "knowledge" and "conception": for these
 76     IV,  4 |          conversion an "object of knowledge" and an "object of conception"
 77     IV,  4 |           one were to assert that knowledge is a kind of sensation,
 78     IV,  4 |           then also the object of knowledge will have to be a kind of
 79     IV,  4 |          is not: for an object of knowledge is not always an object
 80     IV,  4 |         sensation: for objects of knowledge include some of the objects
 81     IV,  4 |           the genus of "object of knowledge": and if this be so, neither
 82     IV,  4 |          sensation" the genus of "knowledge".~Seeing that of relative
 83     IV,  4 |       e.g. if the term "object of knowledge" be applied to the soul:
 84     IV,  4 |           quite possible that the knowledge of itself should be possessed
 85     IV,  4 |         is possible for this same knowledge to be found in some one
 86     IV,  4 |          found in the contrary or knowledge in the object of knowledge,
 87     IV,  4 |        knowledge in the object of knowledge, unless the object of knowledge
 88     IV,  4 |   knowledge, unless the object of knowledge happen to be a soul or a
 89     IV,  4 |        memory" is the "abiding of knowledge". For "abiding" is always
 90     IV,  4 |            so that the abiding of knowledge also will be found in knowledge.
 91     IV,  4 |   knowledge also will be found in knowledge. Memory, then, is found
 92     IV,  4 |         Memory, then, is found in knowledge, seeing that it is the abiding
 93     IV,  4 |         that it is the abiding of knowledge. But this is impossible,
 94     IV,  4 |          memory be the abiding of knowledge, the same argument in regard
 95     IV,  5 |          well, and what contains "knowledge of grammar" contains "knowledge"
 96     IV,  5 |   knowledge of grammar" contains "knowledge" as well. If, therefore,
 97     IV,  5 |           respect, nor is grammar knowledge in a particular respect
 98     IV,  5 |      believed, any more than that knowledge is a knower or motion a
 99     IV,  6 |          being musical, possesses knowledge in some respect, then also "
100     IV,  6 |          is a particular kind of "knowledge"; and also that if what
101     IV,  6 |           you wish to prove that "knowledge" is a form of "conviction",
102     IV,  6 |       convinced: for then clearly knowledge would be a particular kind
103      V,  1 |        being capable of receiving knowledge" in the case of man. A "
104      V,  1 |     possesses, in comparison with knowledge, viz. that the former is
105      V,  2 |            e.g.) seeing that "the knowledge of this" signifies many
106      V,  2 |       means (1) the possession of knowledge by it, (2) the use of its
107      V,  2 |         by it, (2) the use of its knowledge by it, (3) the existence
108      V,  2 |          it, (3) the existence of knowledge about it, (4) the use of
109      V,  2 |          about it, (4) the use of knowledge about it-no property of
110      V,  2 |      about it-no property of the "knowledge of this" could be rendered
111      V,  2 |       animal capable of acquiring knowledge" as a property of man has
112      V,  2 |          that it is a property of knowledge to be a "conception incontrovertible
113      V,  2 |         therefore the property of knowledge could not have been correctly
114      V,  3 |          that it is a property of knowledge to be "the most convincing
115      V,  3 |            and so the property of knowledge would in this respect have
116      V,  3 |       animal capable of receiving knowledge", has rendered the property
117      V,  4 |       animal capable of receiving knowledge" is true of every man, and
118      V,  4 |       animal capable of receiving knowledge". commonplace rule means-for
119      V,  4 |     living being that partakes of knowledge" is true of God, while "
120      V,  4 |     living being that partakes of knowledge’ could not be a property
121      V,  4 |       animal capable of receiving knowledge" always and of necessity
122      V,  4 |       animal capable of receiving knowledge" would be a property of "
123      V,  5 |       animal capable of receiving knowledge" both intends, and by his
124      V,  5 |       animal capable of receiving knowledge" would not be upset or shown
125      V,  7 |         and the base, since it is knowledge of each of them, and it
126      V,  7 |        property of prudence to be knowledge of the noble, it could not
127      V,  7 |        property of prudence to be knowledge of the base. If, on the
128      V,  7 |    property of prudence to be the knowledge of the noble, it could not
129      V,  7 |          property of it to be the knowledge of the base.] For it is
130     VI,  2 |       instance, if he has defined knowledge as "unsupplantable", or
131     VI,  3 |    addition "capable of receiving knowledge" is superfluous; for strike
132     VI,  3 |         he defines "medicine" as "knowledge of what makes for health
133     VI,  5 |          define "grammar" as the "knowledge how to write from dictation":
134     VI,  5 |          also to say that it is a knowledge how to read as well. For
135     VI,  5 |           For in rendering it as "knowledge of writing" has no more
136     VI,  5 |          than by rendering it as "knowledge of reading": neither in
137     VI,  5 |         better; for every form of knowledge and potentiality is generally
138     VI,  6 |            as in the case also of knowledge. This is classed as speculative,
139     VI,  6 |      affection or disposition, as knowledge, too, is formed in the soul,
140     VI,  8 |           e.g. if he has defined "knowledge" as an "incontrovertible
141     VI,  8 |      therefore, to have said that knowledge is "conception of a knowable"
142     VI,  8 |         has defined "grammar" as "knowledge of letters": whereas in
143     VI,  9 |        one thing: for in defining knowledge, a man in a sense defines
144     VI,  9 |        and likewise also what has knowledge and what lacks it, and what
145     VI,  9 |           it is the privation of "knowledge"; or has failed to add in
146     VI,  9 |          is not that which has no knowledge, but rather that which has
147     VI,  9 |        denote a mere privation of knowledge.~
148     VI,  11|       explanation of "speculative knowledge" as "speculative conception":
149     VI,  11|           less familiar term than knowledge; for the one is the genus
150     VI,  12|        terms: for every object of knowledge is a term relative to knowledge:
151     VI,  12|   knowledge is a term relative to knowledge: likewise, also, with other
152     VI,  14|    substance capable of receiving knowledge: for it has a like capacity
153    VII,  1 |            virtue" and the other "knowledge": or see if, though the
154    VII,  3 |      forgetfulness be the loss of knowledge, to forget is to lose knowledge,
155    VII,  3 |   knowledge, to forget is to lose knowledge, and to have forgotten is
156    VII,  3 |         forgotten is to have lost knowledge. If, then, any one whatever
157   VIII,  1 |      secure an admission that the knowledge of contraries is one, one
158   VIII,  1 |          will then argue that the knowledge of contraries is also the
159   VIII,  1 |        other person admit that as knowledge and ignorance of contraries
160   VIII,  1 | perception is the same, so is the knowledge also. This argument resembles
161   VIII,  1 |        distinction of one form of knowledge as better than another by
162   VIII,  2 |          the man who has lost his knowledge of a thing has forgotten
163   VIII,  2 |         thing alters, he has lost knowledge of it, but he has not forgotten
164   VIII,  2 |        that if a person have lost knowledge of a thing while it still
165   VIII,  13|          trying to prove that the knowledge of contraries is one and
166   VIII,  13|        and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites in general
167   VIII,  13|        undertook to show that the knowledge of contraries is always
168   VIII,  13|           having secured that the knowledge of contraries is one, he
169   VIII,  13|         he were to claim that the knowledge of what makes for health
170   VIII,  14|      Moreover, as contributing to knowledge and to philosophic wisdom
171   VIII,  14|         great difference in one’s knowledge of the multiples of other
172   VIII,  14|            and to have a thorough knowledge of premisses at the tip
173   VIII,  14|         that "there cannot be one knowledge of more than one thing":