Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |          the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such
  2      I,  1 |   premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning, on the other
  3      I,  1 |   generally accepted. Things are "true" and "primary" which are
  4      I,  1 |           things that are neither true and primary, nor yet generally
  5      I,  1 |      science in question, are not true; for he effects his mis-reasoning
  6      I,  5 |           happens (accidit) to be true of them; such as, for example,
  7      I,  6 |         the definition is not the true genus, or that any of the
  8      I,  7 |          what I have just said is true may be best seen where one
  9      I,  14|        statements that seem to be true in all or in most cases,
 10      I,  18|          the many senses some are true and others are false. This
 11      I,  18|       that among similars what is true of one is true also of the
 12      I,  18|   similars what is true of one is true also of the rest. If, then,
 13     II,  1 |      possible for something to be true conditionally and not universally.
 14     II,  1 |  attribute of S", then it will be true by conversion to say that "
 15     II,  1 |           an animal". The same is true also in the case of a property;
 16     II,  2 |        untrue has been assumed as true in the definitions. Thus (
 17     II,  2 |          whether the statement is true or false; e.g. if he is "
 18     II,  3 |          an indication that it is true in the one sense and not
 19     II,  3 |         ways. The same rule holds true also of desire and all other
 20     II,  4 |         view, while the second is true. For there is no necessity
 21     II,  4 |            the former argument is true while the latter is fallacious;
 22     II,  6 |         of necessity. The same is true also if he has declared
 23     II,  7 |         such a kind that if it be true, contrary predicates must
 24     II,  8 |      generally received as really true; for many people deny that
 25     II,  9 |      whereas if the latter be not true, neither is the former,
 26     II,  9 |       destruction the converse is true: for if the modes of destruction
 27     II,  10|      things"; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know
 28     II,  10|         latter proposition be not true, neither was the former
 29    III,  2 |     raised to this that it is not true: for it is quite possible
 30    III,  6 |          particular: for if it be true of all, it is true also
 31    III,  6 |          it be true of all, it is true also of some, and if untrue
 32     IV,  1 |           the species rendered is true, while the genus is not
 33     IV,  2 |        neither of these things is true of the genus rendered; for
 34     IV,  2 |         rendered could not be the true genus.~Look, also, at the
 35     IV,  2 |       what is rendered is not the true genus. [Again, see whether
 36     IV,  2 |          been rendered is not the true genus: for had it been the
 37     IV,  2 |           genus. And that this is true is clear: for a thing’s
 38     IV,  4 |           be generally considered true: for virtue is a kind of "
 39     IV,  4 |    possibly it is not universally true that species and genus are
 40     IV,  5 |         life. That this saying is true would appear clear if any
 41     IV,  5 |         of which the genus is not true, but only in cases where
 42     IV,  5 |           the genus rendered is a true predicate. For in some cases,
 43     IV,  5 |          not generally held to be true. For people tell you that
 44     IV,  5 |           for the genus should be true of all its species. Likewise
 45     IV,  6 |      could not be the genus: for "true of S" is the only description
 46      V,  1 |          property is one which is true at every time, and never
 47      V,  1 |          property is one which is true at some particular time,
 48      V,  2 |      property (for each term is a true predicate of fire alone);
 49      V,  3 |          the subject must also be true of anything to which we
 50      V,  3 |            This principle will be true in the case of any attributes
 51      V,  4 |          of them at all, or to be true of them in that particular
 52      V,  4 |    example, inasmuch as it is not true of the geometrician that
 53      V,  4 |          the property rendered be true of every instance, and true
 54      V,  4 |       true of every instance, and true in that particular respect:
 55      V,  4 |           receiving knowledge" is true of every man, and true of
 56      V,  4 |         is true of every man, and true of him qua man, it would
 57      V,  4 |           description fails to be true of that of which the name
 58      V,  4 |         that of which the name is true; and if the name fails to
 59      V,  4 |           if the name fails to be true of that of which the description
 60      V,  4 |          which the description is true: for constructive purposes,
 61      V,  4 |         partakes of knowledge" is true of God, while "man" is not
 62      V,  4 |    predicate "living creature" is true of that of which "having
 63      V,  4 |          which "having a soul" is true, and "having a soul" is
 64      V,  4 |            and "having a soul" is true of that of which the predicate "
 65      V,  4 |    predicate "living creature" is true; and so "having a soul would
 66      V,  4 |        alleged property is always true: for then what is stated
 67      V,  5 |   something else, then it will be true of its primary subject as
 68      V,  5 |      surface", "coloured" will be true of body as well; whereas
 69      V,  5 |          name as well will not be true of that of which the description
 70      V,  5 |          which the description is true.~In the case of some properties
 71      V,  5 |          its name too will not be true of that of which the description
 72      V,  5 |          which the description is true, as is the case with "coloured",
 73      V,  5 |      property of the whole be not true of the part, or if that
 74      V,  5 |          of such a kind as is not true of the part (for a particular
 75      V,  5 |         attribute such as, though true of some air, is still not
 76      V,  5 |          see whether, while it is true of each of the things with
 77      V,  5 |           Thus (e.g.) while it is true of earth everywhere that
 78      V,  8 |          which the description is true, the name is not true as
 79      V,  8 |          is true, the name is not true as well: for though the
 80     VI,  1 |         either (1) that it is not true at all to apply the expression
 81     VI,  1 |     definition of Man ought to be true of every man); or (2) that
 82     VI,  1 |        the expression be not also true of that of which the term
 83     VI,  1 |         that of which the term is true you should proceed to examine
 84     VI,  1 |           is always "Is so and so true or untrue?": for whenever
 85     VI,  1 |      belongs, we declare it to be true, while whenever we argue
 86     VI,  3 |           definition would not be true unless the phlegm comes
 87     VI,  3 |         anything whatever that is true be added, the whole too
 88     VI,  6 | differentia exists, it yet is not true of the genus, for then,
 89     VI,  6 |    differentia of a thing are all true of the genus to which the
 90     VI,  6 |        also, see if, though it be true, yet the addition of it
 91     VI,  6 |           If, however, this be no true differentia, no more is
 92     VI,  6 |    affirmation or its negation is true, length must always either
 93     VI,  6 |         the other will have to be true of "length" universally,
 94     VI,  6 |       universally, if it is to be true of the genus at all: and
 95     VI,  6 |          of the genera as well is true of that of which the differentia
 96     VI,  6 |          which the differentia is true, it clearly follows that
 97     VI,  8 |          perhaps this rule is not true in all cases, for almost
 98     VI,  10|         ambiguous term, it is not true of any one of the objects
 99     VI,  13|            the definition will be true of both and yet of neither
100     VI,  13|          and if this be in no way true of the A and B in question,
101     VI,  13|        above distinguished, it be true that A and B are each found
102    VII,  1 |         supposition, which may be true or may be false (it makes
103    VII,  3 |         But this much at least is true, that the differentiae of
104    VII,  5 |        one has to show that it is true of everything included under
105    VII,  5 |         the genus rendered is the true genus, and that the formula
106   VIII,  1 |           his reasoning, although true and familiar, may be refused
107   VIII,  2 |       case where it does not hold true: if he refuse to admit it,
108   VIII,  2 |           partly false and partly true are of this type: for in
109   VIII,  2 |          a part to leave the rest true. If, however, you formulate
110   VIII,  2 |        all propositions that hold true of several cases, and to
111   VIII,  2 |         not so, they admit it for true.~The conclusion should not
112   VIII,  5 |       anything that appears to be true should be granted, and,
113   VIII,  7 |         it says to be universally true or false, he should give
114   VIII,  7 |          other hand, it be partly true and partly false, he should
115   VIII,  7 |        and also that in one it is true, in the other false: for
116   VIII,  8 |          be admitted, if they are true and generally held. On the
117   VIII,  8 |      counter-proof that it is not true, far more likely is he to
118   VIII,  10|           the argument; it may be true that the point claimed is
119   VIII,  11|         has to reason not only to true conclusions, but also to
120   VIII,  11|            and not always through true premisses, but sometimes
121   VIII,  11|           well. For often, when a true proposition is put forward,
122   VIII,  11|        his conclusion be false or true: what kind of syllogisms
123   VIII,  11|         conclusion, or if, though true, they require more trouble
124   VIII,  11|           generally held and also true whereby it could easily
125   VIII,  11|         as are generally held and true, and moreover does not rest
126   VIII,  11|         those which bring about a true conclusion by means of false
127   VIII,  11|       from a false premiss, but a true conclusion may sometimes
128   VIII,  12|     whether the result reached be true or false: (4) if the conclusion
129   VIII,  12|        sometimes false, sometimes true: for while a false conclusion
130   VIII,  12|      result of false premisses, a true conclusion may be drawn
131   VIII,  12|       from premisses that are not true, as was said above as well.~
132   VIII,  12|      merits in preference to many true ones an argument which demolishes
133   VIII,  12|    argument which demolishes some true proposition if it does so
134   VIII,  12| demonstrate other things that are true: for one of the premisses
135   VIII,  12|      demonstrated. If, however, a true conclusion were to be reached
136   VIII,  12|        second, "Is the conclusion true or false?"; the third, "
137   VIII,  12|   dialectical, whereas if, though true, they be generally rejected,
138   VIII,  13|           also beg contraries the true account has been given in
139   VIII,  14|         power right to choose the true and shun the false. Men