Book, Paragraph

  1      I,  1 |    appropriate to the science in question, are not true; for he effects
  2      I,  5 |       definition of the thing in question, because a definition is
  3      I,  5 |         and likewise also of the question, "Are sensation and knowledge
  4      I,  5 |          mention in reply to the question, "What is the object before
  5      I,  5 |       case of man, if asked that question, it is appropriate to say "
  6      I,  5 |       say "He is an animal". The question, "Is one thing in the same
  7      I,  5 |        one?" is also a "generic" question; for a question of that
  8      I,  5 |         generic" question; for a question of that kind as well falls
  9      I,  5 | essential meaning of the term in question. To Accident are to be attached
 10      I,  5 |        such as, for example, the question, "Is the honourable or the
 11      I,  5 |        For in all such cases the question is "to which of the two
 12      I,  5 |        two does the predicate in question happen (accidit) to belong
 13      I,  6 |      shown that the attribute in question fails to belong only to
 14      I,  9 |         which the four orders in question are found. These are ten
 15      I,  10|          these things, e.g. on a question of medicine they will agree
 16      I,  10|        with the doctor, and on a question of geometry with the geometrician;
 17      I,  11|       give our reasons, e.g. the question whether the universe is
 18      I,  15|         between the terms now in question depends upon the privation
 19     II,  3 |   descriptions of the subject in question; e.g. by showing that it
 20     II,  4 |        possessed of the genus in question, or are described by terms
 21     II,  4 |        in regard to the thing in question, what it is whose reality
 22     II,  4 |          reality of the thing in question, or what it is whose reality
 23     II,  4 |          follows if the thing in question be real: if you wish to
 24     II,  4 |          reality of the thing in question will follow (for if the
 25     II,  4 |          real, then the thing in question will also have been shown
 26     II,  4 |          is real if the thing in question be real, for if we show
 27     II,  4 |        follows from the thing in question is unreal, we shall have
 28     II,  4 |          demolished the thing in question.~Moreover, look at the time
 29     II,  5 |        when moreover the view in question happens to be one of a kind
 30     II,  7 |         to which the accident in question has been declared to belong:
 31     II,  7 |          shown that the thing in question will not admit of the contrary
 32     II,  10|          are like the subject in question, and see if they are in
 33     II,  10|          to be like. The rule in question is useful for both purposes;
 34    III,  1 |                            1~THE question which is the more desirable,
 35    III,  1 |        to belong to the genus in question is called by the generic
 36    III,  3 |        showing that the thing in question is in like measure objectionable
 37    III,  6 |                         6~If the question be put in a particular and
 38    III,  6 |       neither does the object in question exhibit it; e.g. if some
 39    III,  6 |     instance of the character in question; e.g. if it be maintained
 40    III,  6 |     hypothesis universalizes the question, whereas it was stated in
 41    III,  6 |      good, if the proposition in question is to be demolished. And
 42    III,  6 |         good, the proposition in question is not yet demolished. It
 43    III,  6 |         good, the proposition in question will have been proved. Likewise,
 44    III,  6 |         good, the proposition in question will have been demolished.
 45    III,  6 |      demolished the statement in question. If the statement be made
 46    III,  6 |    knowledge, the proposition in question will have been demolished.~
 47     IV,  1 |      different from the thing in question; or, if your argument be
 48     IV,  3 |           clearly the species in question is found in it as well.
 49     IV,  3 |      clearly also the species in question is found in the genus in
 50     IV,  3 |         is found in the genus in question.~Again, consider in the
 51     IV,  4 |         then also the species in question would be found in the genus
 52     IV,  4 |         be found in the genus in question: e.g. if "blindness" be
 53     IV,  4 |    something. Hence the terms in question are not the genera of "double",
 54     IV,  5 |        For both of the things in question follow in a certain sense
 55     IV,  6 |          The commonplace rule in question is useful especially in
 56     IV,  6 |          species of the genus in question, then if the one be a species,
 57      V,  1 |                            1~THE question whether the attribute stated
 58      V,  1 |       many; whereas an arguable’ question is one in regard to which
 59      V,  4 |         made by these means. The question, on the other hand, whether
 60      V,  4 |          is said of the thing in question alone, and is said of it
 61      V,  4 |       property of the subject in question. Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as
 62      V,  5 |       mistake. For the things in question should all be of one species,
 63      V,  5 |         be, then the property in question will belong to some of them
 64      V,  7 |          to it as the subject in question; for then neither will the
 65      V,  7 |          to it as the subject in question, then it will not be a property
 66      V,  7 |          belong to the "idea" in question, or fails to belong to it
 67      V,  7 |           see if the property in question belongs to the idea, and
 68      V,  7 |        of which the predicate in question has been stated not to be
 69      V,  8 |         when the potentiality in question cannot belong to what does
 70      V,  8 |         when the potentiality in question can belong to what does
 71     VI,  1 |      Accident. For there too the question is always "Is so and so
 72     VI,  5 |           Again, if the thing in question be not placed in its own
 73     VI,  6 |          containing the genus in question. For the general view is
 74     VI,  6 |       reflect on both sides of a question and find everything alike
 75     VI,  8 |          does render the word in question: for there can be no Idea
 76     VI,  10|          of the people, yet in a question of terminology one is bound
 77     VI,  13|       way true of the A and B in question, clearly the definition
 78    VII,  1 |         to destroy the things in question of their formation and destruction,
 79    VII,  1 |         same, and it is with the question whether they are or are
 80    VII,  5 |       included under the term in question, whereas to overthrow one
 81    VII,  5 |      must belong to the thing in question, yet the genus may very
 82   VIII,  1 |      familiar and as near to the question in hand as possible: for
 83   VIII,  2 |         in some cases to ask the question in its universal form, but
 84   VIII,  2 |  distinction before putting your question in such cases: for so long
 85   VIII,  2 |          be put in the form of a question; if it be, and the man shakes
 86   VIII,  2 |       even if it be not put as a question but advanced as a consequence,
 87   VIII,  2 |          man merely asks it as a question without even saying that
 88   VIII,  2 |      failed.~Not every universal question can form a dialectical proposition
 89   VIII,  2 | questions, or else asks the same question a large number of times:
 90   VIII,  6 |       definite person. Now every question asked is bound to involve
 91   VIII,  7 |         reply "Yes" or "No" to a question which may mean different
 92   VIII,  7 |       put. If he understands the question and yet it covers many senses,
 93   VIII,  7 |    ambiguity, but assents to the question having in view the one sense
 94   VIII,  7 |       disagree. If, however, the question is both clear and simple,
 95   VIII,  13|  questioner may beg the original question and also beg contraries
 96   VIII,  13|     appear to beg their original question in five ways: the first
 97   VIII,  13|     shown. Again, a man begs the question if he begs his conclusion
 98   VIII,  13|          they beg their original question. For it would happen, firstly,
 99   VIII,  13|        from begging the original question in this way: in the latter
100   VIII,  13|        we tell that the original question has been begged: whereas
101   VIII,  14|         whether some one put his question properly or improperly (