Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  10|     friends, one ought also to do evil to one’s enemies. it might
 2      I,  10|          were a contrary to doing evil to one’s enemies: but whether
 3      I,  14|        the knowledge of "good and evil", of "white and black",
 4     II,  2 |           at the successes of the evil, then clearly the indignant
 5     II,  7 |         good to friends and to do evil to enemies, or per contra
 6     II,  7 |      enemies, or per contra to do evil to friends and to do good
 7     II,  7 |         good to friends and to do evil to friends, or to do good
 8     II,  7 |         good to enemies and to do evil to enemies. Or (3) a single
 9     II,  7 |         good to enemies, or to do evil to friends and evil to enemies.~
10     II,  7 |         to do evil to friends and evil to enemies.~The first two
11     II,  7 |          contrary to the doing of evil to enemies: for both courses
12     II,  7 |  disposition. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary to the
13     II,  7 |          contrary to the doing of evil to friends: for it proceeds
14     II,  7 |          enemies and the doing of evil to friends. Likewise, if
15     II,  9 |          pleasant; for neither is evil painful: or that, if the
16     II,  9 |      their modes of generation be evil, then they themselves also
17     II,  9 |          they themselves also are evil. In regard to modes of destruction
18     II,  9 |           they themselves rank as evil things; whereas if the modes
19     II,  9 |           of destruction count as evil, they themselves count as
20     II,  9 |           they themselves rank as evil.~
21     II,  10|           and if to do a wrong be evil, see whether also to do
22     II,  10|        greater wrong is a greater evil. Now this rule is of use
23     II,  11|           the addition of good to evil does not necessarily make
24    III,  1 |         is in itself the cause of evil is more objectionable than
25    III,  2 |            if the consequences be evil, that is more desirable
26    III,  2 |           is followed by the less evil. For though both may be
27    III,  2 |          free from connexion with evil: for what is not attended
28    III,  6 |       good, then also all pain is evil, and the claim that if some
29    III,  6 |            then also some pain is evil. Moreover, if some form
30    III,  6 |          is just is in some cases evil; and if what happens justly
31    III,  6 |           justly is in some cases evil, then also what happens
32    III,  6 |     knowledge is in some cases an evil thing. Likewise, also, if
33    III,  6 |        thing or its production an evil thing, then knowledge will
34    III,  6 |          will be in some cases an evil thing; e.g. if for a man
35    III,  6 |          and to remember it be an evil thing, then the knowledge
36    III,  6 |     conduct may be taken to be an evil thing. The same holds also
37     IV,  3 |           the case of "good" and "evil": for neither of these is
38     IV,  3 |     although there is one between evil and good. Or see whether,
39     IV,  3 |        for both are in the genus "evil"), whereas moderate amount’,
40     IV,  3 |    between them, is found not in "evil" but in "good". Look and
41     IV,  5 |         capable (we say) of doing evil. So then "capacity" can
42      V,  3 |           most direct opposite of evil", has employed the opposite
43      V,  6 |           justice, and the lowest evil to the highest good, but "
44      V,  6 |       therefore "to be the lowest evil" could not be a property
45      V,  6 |           Thus (e.g.) inasmuch as evil is contrary to good, and
46      V,  6 |           would be a property of "evil".~Secondly (h) look from
47      V,  6 |        will be a property of "the evil".~
48     VI,  4 |     opposite, e.g.i. good through evil: for opposites are always
49     VI,  9 |          injurious"=productive of evil" or "destructive of good",
50     VI,  9 |       defined as "the contrary of evil", then, since it is clear
51     VI,  9 |           since it is clear that "evil" too will be "the contrary
52     VI,  9 |    inherent in the definition of "evil". If, then, "good" be the
53     VI,  9 |          good" be the contrary of evil, and evil be nothing other
54     VI,  9 |         the contrary of evil, and evil be nothing other than the "
55     VI,  13|           if the whole be good or evil, and the parts neither,
56     VI,  13|           if the parts be good or evil and the whole neither. For
57     VI,  13| distinctly good than the other is evil, and yet the product be
58     VI,  13|      product be no more good than evil, e.g. suppose shamelessness
59     VI,  13|   goodness of courage exceeds the evil of false opinion; accordingly
60     VI,  13|           at least more good than evil. Or it may be that this
61    VII,  1 |        being "good" and the other evil’, or the one being "virtue"
62   VIII,  2 |         the good, the greater the evil that is its opposite": for
63   VIII,  2 |        than vigour, has a greater evil as its opposite: for disease
64   VIII,  2 |          for disease is a greater evil than debility. In this case
65   VIII,  2 |      greater good has the greater evil as its opposite, unless
66   VIII,  5 |     opinions, e.g. that "good and evil are the same thing, as Heraclitus
67   VIII,  13|        the same thing is good and evil; thirdly, suppose any one