Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  5 |          also of the question, "Are sensation and knowledge the same or
 2      I,  13|             the expedient"; and (2) Sensation differs from knowledge in
 3      I,  15|          This is plain also through sensation: for of things that are
 4      I,  15|            in kind we have the same sensation, whereas we do not judge
 5      I,  15|         judge clearness by the same sensation in the case of sound and
 6      I,  16|           apart, e.g. "Wherein does sensation differ from knowledge?:
 7      I,  17|          object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the object of
 8      I,  17|            related to the object of sensation), and "As A is in B, so
 9     II,  7 |            they are objects both of sensation and of thought. For according
10     II,  7 |            also they are objects of sensation, if they exist in us: for
11     II,  7 |           us: for it is through the sensation of sight that we recognize
12     II,  8 |         bound to be direct: e.g. as sensation follows sight, while absence
13     II,  8 |             sight, while absence of sensation follows blindness. For the
14     II,  8 |    blindness. For the opposition of sensation to absence of sensation
15     II,  8 |             sensation to absence of sensation is an opposition of the
16     II,  8 |       conception; and if sight be a sensation, then also the object of
17     II,  8 |            of sight is an object of sensation. An objection may be made
18     II,  8 |        described: for the object of sensation is an object of knowledge,
19     II,  8 |        object of knowledge, whereas sensation is not knowledge. The objection
20     II,  8 |             knowledge of objects of sensation. Moreover, the principle
21     II,  8 |             show that the object of sensation is not an object of knowledge,
22     II,  8 |          the ground that neither is sensation knowledge.~
23    III,  6 |           Moreover, if some form of sensation be not a capacity, then
24    III,  6 |             some form of failure of sensation is not a failure of capacity.
25     IV,  4 |           genus containing sight be sensation, then blindness will not
26     IV,  4 |             blindness will not be a sensation. Secondly, if there be a
27     IV,  4 |             Secondly, if there be a sensation. Secondly, if there be a
28     IV,  4 |          then "sight" is a form of "sensation".~Again, look at the negations
29     IV,  4 |         that knowledge is a kind of sensation, then also the object of
30     IV,  4 |           to be a kind of object of sensation, whereas it is not: for
31     IV,  4 |             not always an object of sensation: for objects of knowledge
32     IV,  4 |           as well. Hence "object of sensation" is not the genus of "object
33     IV,  4 |             this be so, neither is "sensation" the genus of "knowledge".~
34     IV,  5 |           state", e.g. by defining "sensation" as "movement communicated
35     IV,  5 | communicated through the body": for sensation is a "state", whereas movement
36      V,  2 |             that the "possession of sensation" is a property of "animal"
37      V,  2 |         senses; so that to "possess sensation" would in this respect have
38      V,  2 |          thing, viz. (1) to possess sensation, (2) to use one’s sensation,
39      V,  2 |         sensation, (2) to use one’s sensation, being naturally sentient’
40      V,  3 |            is not obvious except by sensation: for then the property will
41      V,  3 |          taken beyond the sphere of sensation, becomes uncertain. For
42      V,  3 |             it is evidenced only by sensation. This principle will be
43      V,  3 |               which is evidenced by sensation; and so the sun’s property
44      V,  3 |             over the earth, because sensation then fails us. For constructive
45      V,  3 |         kind that is not obvious to sensation, or, if it be sensible,
46      V,  5 |      because it is partaken of, as "sensation" belongs to "animal" (for
47      V,  5 |           other things as well have sensation, e.g. man, but they have
48      V,  6 |          deafness" to be a "lack of sensation", neither could it be a
49      V,  6 |      property of "hearing" to be a "sensation". For constructive purposes,
50      V,  8 |      inasmuch as a higher degree of sensation is a property of a higher
51      V,  8 |             life, a lower degree of sensation also would be a property
52      V,  8 |           of the lowest degree, and sensation simply of life simply.~Also
53      V,  8 |           for example, inasmuch as "sensation" is less likely to be a
54      V,  8 |            animal" than life’, and "sensation" is a property of animal, "
55     VI,  6 |             sleep" is a "failure of sensation", or that "perplexity" is
56     VI,  6 |        sleep is not an attribute of sensation, whereas it ought to be,
57     VI,  6 |           be, if it is a failure of sensation. Likewise, perplexity is
58     VI,  6 |           nor again is a failure of sensation sleep, but the one is the
59     VI,  6 |       either we go to sleep because sensation fails, or sensation fails
60     VI,  6 |         because sensation fails, or sensation fails because we go to sleep.