Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  11|         avoidance, e.g. whether pleasure is to be chosen or not,
 2      I,  15|       absolutely none; e.g. the pleasure of drinking has a contrary
 3      I,  15|     pain of thirst, whereas the pleasure of seeing that the diagonal
 4      I,  15|         side has none, so that "pleasure" is used in more than one
 5      I,  15|       food means "productive of pleasure", and in the case of medicine "
 6     II,  1 |     problems are such as "Every pleasure is good" and "No pleasure
 7     II,  1 |       pleasure is good" and "No pleasure is good"; particular problems
 8     II,  1 |      problems are such as "Some pleasure is good" and "Some pleasure
 9     II,  1 |     pleasure is good" and "Some pleasure is not good". The methods
10     II,  6 |         the same thing, to wit, Pleasure. If then any one says that
11     II,  10|         of the subject: e.g. if pleasure be good, see whether also
12     II,  10|      see whether also a greater pleasure be a greater good: and if
13    III,  2 |        than if unaccompanied by pleasure, and likewise when free
14    III,  3 |         expediency or honour or pleasure. For what is useful for
15    III,  3 |         which serves to promote pleasure. Likewise also in the case
16    III,  3 |       greater hindrance both to pleasure and to being good.~Moreover,
17    III,  6 |     alike the claim that if all pleasure be good, then also all pain
18    III,  6 |      and the claim that if some pleasure be good, then also some
19    III,  6 |       cases objectionable, then pleasure is in some cases an objectionable
20    III,  6 |     some cases beneficial, then pleasure is in some cases a beneficial
21    III,  6 |       if anything that destroys pleasure or knowledge be in some
22    III,  6 |        then we may take it that pleasure or knowledge is in some
23    III,  6 |        in a greater degree than pleasure, while no form of knowledge
24    III,  6 |       then you may take it that pleasure is not good either. Also,
25    III,  6 |         a man has asserted that pleasure is good or is not good,
26    III,  6 |         meant that a particular pleasure is good, you must show universally
27    III,  6 |        show universally that no pleasure is good, if the proposition
28    III,  6 |      meant that some particular pleasure is not good you must show
29    III,  6 |       show universally that all pleasure is good: it is impossible
30    III,  6 |       show that some particular pleasure is not good or is good,
31    III,  6 |       show universally that all pleasure is good, or whether we show
32    III,  6 |       we show that a particular pleasure is good, the proposition
33    III,  6 |      argue that some particular pleasure is not good, if we show
34    III,  6 |        good, if we show that no pleasure is good or that a particular
35    III,  6 |       good or that a particular pleasure is not good, we shall have
36    III,  6 |       show that some particular pleasure is not good. If, on the
37    III,  6 |    attribute of some particular pleasure to be good, while of some
38    III,  6 |    whether it be shown that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, is
39    III,  6 |        all pleasure, or that no pleasure, is good, the proposition
40    III,  6 |     stated that only one single pleasure is good, it is possible
41    III,  6 |         for by showing that all pleasure, or that no pleasure, or
42    III,  6 |        all pleasure, or that no pleasure, or that more than one pleasure,
43    III,  6 | pleasure, or that more than one pleasure, is good, we shall have
44     IV,  1 |        down to be the genus of "pleasure", see whether some particular
45     IV,  1 |         whether some particular pleasure be not good: for, if so,
46     IV,  1 |       good’ is not the genus of pleasure: for the genus is predicated
47     IV,  1 |       be stated as the genus of pleasure, you should look and see
48     IV,  1 |      you should look and see if pleasure be neither locomotion nor
49     IV,  1 |        species as well: so that pleasure could not be a species of
50     IV,  4 |     relation of the pleasant to pleasure is like that of the useful
51     IV,  4 |         the other. If therefore pleasure be a kind of "good", then
52     IV,  4 | productive of good, seeing that pleasure is good. In the same way
53     IV,  5 |          desires". (for in this pleasure also is found), whereas "
54     VI,  8 |        for the pleasant but for pleasure: for this is our purpose
55     VI,  8 |       the present experience of pleasure to its cessation, so that
56     VI,  8 |        gives way to any sort of pleasure whatever who is called incontinent,
57     VI,  8 |        way to a certain kind of pleasure. Or again, people sometimes
58   VIII,  9 |         men’s wishes, e.g. that pleasure is the good, and that to