Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  4 |           are "problems". Now every proposition and every problem indicates
 2      I,  4 |             by itself constitutes a proposition or problem, but only that
 3      I,  4 |             between a problem and a proposition is a difference in the turn
 4      I,  4 |            it not?" the result is a proposition: but if thus, "Is "an animal
 5      I,  4 |            number: for out of every proposition you will make a problem
 6      I,  10|             given of a "dialectical proposition" and a "dialectical problem".
 7      I,  10|       problem". For it is not every proposition nor yet every problem that
 8      I,  10|             his senses would make a proposition of what no one holds, nor
 9      I,  10|           assent. Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something
10      I,  13|            it is possible to make a proposition corresponding to each of
11      I,  13|      vigorous to vigour’. The first proposition depends upon the use of
12      I,  14| distinctions drawn in regard to the proposition: thus one may first take
13      I,  14|           of the aforesaid kinds of proposition is not easily rendered in
14     II,  2 |             make the problem into a proposition for himself, and then bring
15     II,  10|          them. If, then, the latter proposition be not true, neither was
16    III,  6 |            pleasure is good, if the proposition in question is to be demolished.
17    III,  6 |            not good or is good, the proposition in question is not yet demolished.
18    III,  6 |    particular pleasure is good, the proposition in question will have been
19    III,  6 |           no pleasure, is good, the proposition in question will have been
20    III,  6 |        itself is not knowledge, the proposition in question will have been
21     IV,  6 |           one else puts forward the proposition, do not accept it universally.
22    VII,  5 |            something by a universal proposition, not even so is there any
23    VII,  5 |           prove the converse of the proposition in the process of overthrowing
24    VII,  5 |             attribute the universal proposition is easier to overthrow than
25    VII,  5 |         single case. The particular proposition is, on the contrary, easier
26   VIII,  1 |         induction, by formulating a proposition to that effect in the case
27   VIII,  1 |           the proof of the original proposition is going to be constructed-and
28   VIII,  1 |          distance from the original proposition. Speaking generally, a man
29   VIII,  1 | reasonableness to the denial of the proposition. In the case, however, of
30   VIII,  1 |            Moreover, formulate your proposition as though you did so not
31   VIII,  1 |          secure an admission of his proposition or of its opposite: for
32   VIII,  1 |            admit the more readily a proposition made to serve some other
33   VIII,  1 |           do not formulate the very proposition you need to secure, but
34   VIII,  1 |             Choerilus; for then the proposition is likely to become clearer.~
35   VIII,  2 |      refuses to grant the universal proposition, then it is fair to demand
36   VIII,  2 |           the actual subject of the proposition, unless that subject happen
37   VIII,  2 |     sometimes object to a universal proposition, and bring their objection
38   VIII,  2 |           will the objection to the proposition be deemed valid. If, however,
39   VIII,  2 |          remainder into a universal proposition, until he secures what he
40   VIII,  2 |            more likely to admit the proposition, e.g. that "the greater
41   VIII,  2 |         will be forced to admit the proposition because he cannot foresee
42   VIII,  2 |          however, you formulate the proposition on the strength of many
43   VIII,  2 |     question can form a dialectical proposition as ordinarily understood,
44   VIII,  6 |           too close to the original proposition, and that if it be granted
45   VIII,  6 |         should yet protest that the proposition is too absurd to be admitted.
46   VIII,  8 |            man refuses to admit the proposition without having either a
47   VIII,  10|             Now we may demolish the proposition "Socrates is sitting", and
48   VIII,  11|              For often, when a true proposition is put forward, the dialectician
49   VIII,  11|         Sometimes also when a false proposition is put forward, it has to
50   VIII,  12|          which demolishes some true proposition if it does so from premisses
51   VIII,  14|       equipped for dealing with the proposition stated, and after a few
52   VIII,  14|         Always, in dealing with any proposition, be on the look-out for
53   VIII,  14|        subject or a refutation or a proposition or an objection, or whether
54   VIII,  14|        dialectician. To formulate a proposition is to form a number of things