Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  5 |  different?", for argument about definitions is mostly concerned with
 2      I,  5 |        same branch of inquiry as definitions; and that all the above-mentioned
 3      I,  5 |       lines of attack upon their definitions as well: for when we have
 4      I,  5 |        another not white. Of the definitions of accident the second is
 5      I,  6 |           will be applicable to "definitions" as well. For when we have
 6      I,  12|            12~Having drawn these definitions, we must distinguish how
 7      I,  15|         also try to render their definitions; e.g. we must not merely
 8      I,  15|          is no necessity for the definitions to be different. Thus (e.g.) "
 9      I,  15|  synonymous.~Often in the actual definitions as well ambiguity creeps
10      I,  15|          and for this reason the definitions also should be examined.
11      I,  18|         view to the rendering of definitions. It is useful for inductive
12      I,  18|      useful for the rendering of definitions because, if we are able
13     II,  2 |          Another rule is to make definitions both of an accident and
14     II,  2 |      been assumed as true in the definitions. Thus (e.g.) to see if it
15     II,  2 |          A man should substitute definitions also for the terms contained
16     II,  2 |       the terms contained in his definitions, and not stop until he comes
17     II,  4 |        assertion, look among the definitions, real or apparent, of the
18     II,  4 |       always more easily made on definitions.~Moreover, look and see
19     IV,  1 |         questions that relate to definitions, but dialecticians seldom
20     IV,  2 |        genus.~Look, also, at the definitions of the genera, and see whether
21     IV,  2 |    species. For of necessity the definitions of its genera must be predicated
22      V,  2 |        just as they do in their "definitions" as well: but a property
23      V,  2 |          replaces words by their definitions, as would happen if any
24      V,  2 |          also of the language of definitions, to distinguish. In the
25      V,  2 |       For just as in the case of definitions too there should be no further
26      V,  3 |        of properties, as also of definitions, the first term to be rendered
27     VI,  1 |              1~THE discussion of Definitions falls into five parts. For
28     VI,  2 |       contrary be not clear; for definitions that have been correctly
29     VI,  4 |          that both would then be definitions of the same object. This
30     VI,  4 |      there are to be a number of definitions of the same thing, the essence
31     VI,  4 | represented to be in each of the definitions, and these representations
32     VI,  4 |        the same, inasmuch as the definitions are different. Clearly,
33     VI,  4 |      intelligible to them. Among definitions of this kind are those of
34     VI,  4 |          those who say that such definitions, viz. those which proceed
35     VI,  4 |        man, are really and truly definitions, will have to say that there
36     VI,  4 |       say that there are several definitions of one and the same thing.
37     VI,  7 |          other terms rendered in definitions you should frame definitions
38     VI,  7 |     definitions you should frame definitions in lieu of the terms, and
39     VI,  9 |           Speaking generally, in definitions of this sort it happens
40     VI,  9 |      then clearly neither of the definitions rendered later could be
41     VI,  10|         the word "mortal" in his definitions of living creatures: for
42     VI,  10|  applicable to them two distinct definitions in explanation of the term,
43     VI,  13|         function than this.~Some definitions rendered in this form fail
44     VI,  14|       ought to do in the case of definitions as well: one ought oneself
45     VI,  14|         same thing.~In combating definitions it is always one of the
46     VI,  14|      with lines of attack.~As to definitions, then, let so much suffice.~ ~
47    VII,  3 |      coordinates. For genera and definitions are bound to correspond
48    VII,  3 |          with two things, or two definitions with one thing; for there
49    VII,  5 |         the arguments drawn from definitions, nor yet of the rest: for
50   VIII,  3 |         hardest, however, of all definitions to treat in argument are
51   VIII,  3 |        very easy to show, if the definitions involved, e.g. the nature
52   VIII,  14|    Moreover, get a good stock of definitions: and have those of familiar