Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  5| preferable?" and "Is the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence
 2     II,  2|        happens (accidit) to be a virtue"; but often even without
 3     II,  8|         for upon the one of them virtue follows, and vice upon the
 4    III,  1|         is so per accidens, e.g. virtue than luck (for the former
 5    III,  3|     which possesses the peculiar virtue of the species is more desirable
 6    III,  3|          which serves to promote virtue more than that which serves
 7    III,  6|          if it be shown that all virtue is knowledge, or that no
 8    III,  6|         is knowledge, or that no virtue is so, or that some other
 9    III,  6|        is so, or that some other virtue (e.g. justice) is so, or
10     IV,  2|        the genus of justice. For virtue is its genus as well, and
11     IV,  2|       hold that prudence is both virtue and knowledge, and that
12     IV,  2|        actually is the case with virtue and knowledge. For both
13     IV,  3|          as is the case with (1) virtue and vice and (2) justice
14     IV,  3|         as it is in the cases of virtue and vice and of justice
15     IV,  3|        so too is the species, as virtue to vice and justice to injustice.~
16     IV,  4|   generally considered true: for virtue is a kind of "noble" and
17     IV,  4|           thing, and yet, while "virtue" is a relative term, "good"
18     IV,  6|         called after it: e.g. if virtue admits of a greater degree,
19     IV,  6|  capacity" have more claim than "virtue" to be the genus of self-control,
20     IV,  6|       genus of self-control, and virtue be the genus, so also is
21      V,  1|          does the property which virtue possesses, in comparison
22      V,  3|         that it is a property of virtue to be "what makes its possessor
23      V,  3|           and so the property of virtue would in this respect have
24      V,  6|         essentially "the natural virtue of the rational faculty",
25      V,  6|         essentially "the natural virtue of the faculty of desire".~
26      V,  7|         fails to belong to it in virtue of that character which
27      V,  7|         to it in that respect in virtue of which there is predicated
28     VI,  2|         harmony does not contain virtue, nor virtue harmony. Again,
29     VI,  2|          not contain virtue, nor virtue harmony. Again, see if he
30     VI,  4|         the good" is a "state of virtue" ". For "half" is derived
31     VI,  4|          two" is an even number: virtue also is a kind of good,
32     VI,  4|        whoever employs the term "virtue" employs the term "good",
33     VI,  4|         term "good", seeing that virtue is a certain kind of good:
34     VI,  5|     passes outside the sphere of virtue, and so by leaving out the
35     VI,  6|        as the differentia, e.g. "Virtue is a good or noble state:
36     VI,  6|           good" is the genus of "virtue". Or possibly "good" here
37     VI,  6|           state" is the genus of virtue, clearly "good" cannot be
38     VI,  6|         indicates the essence of virtue, whereas "good" indicates
39     VI,  6|         defining "wisdom" as the virtue of "man" or of the "soul,"
40     VI,  6|    faculty": for "wisdom" is the virtue primarily of the reasoning
41     VI,  6|  reasoning faculty: for it is in virtue of this that both the man
42    VII,  1|         evil’, or the one being "virtue" and the other "knowledge":
43    VII,  3|      injustice; for the one is a virtue and the other a vice of
44    VII,  3|         the body as well has its virtue and vice. But this much