Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |           accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally
 2      I,  10|           contrary to the general opinion; for a man would probably
 3      I,  10|      supposing it to be a general opinion that the knowledge of contraries
 4      I,  10|       probably pass for a general opinion also that the perception
 5      I,  10|      supposing it to be a general opinion that there is but one single
 6      I,  10|          might pass for a general opinion that there is but one science
 7      I,  10|       whereas, if it be a general opinion that there is more than
 8      I,  10|          might pass for a general opinion that there is more than
 9      I,  10|            for if it be a general opinion that one ought to do good
10      I,  10|         it will also be a general opinion that one ought not to do
11      I,  10|          will look like a general opinion that the contrary predicate
12      I,  11|       which either people hold no opinion either way, or the masses
13      I,  11|        the masses hold a contrary opinion to the philosophers, or
14      I,  11|        conflicts with the general opinion; e.g. the view that contradiction
15      I,  11|          are such that we have no opinion about them either way. That
16      I,  11|          in conflict with general opinion. Practically all dialectical
17      I,  14|       only with an eye to general opinion. All propositions should
18      I,  15|    judging according to one’s own opinion, and also of judging as
19      I,  18|           because it is a general opinion that among similars what
20     II,  10|          object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight
21    III,  6 | inflexions of a thing: for public opinion grants alike the claim that
22     IV,  1 |           the genus of "object of opinion". For "object of opinion"
23     IV,  1 |          opinion". For "object of opinion" will be a predicate of
24     IV,  1 |          not exist are objects of opinion; whereas that "being" or "
25     IV,  1 |           the genus of "object of opinion": for of the objects of
26     IV,  1 |       genus, as (e.g.) "object of opinion" has, as compared with "
27     IV,  1 |        what is not are objects of opinion, so that "object of opinion"
28     IV,  1 |       opinion, so that "object of opinion" could not be a species
29     IV,  2 |        truth and falsehood" from "opinion", then neither of the terms
30     VI,  13|      product of courage and false opinion": here the goodness of courage
31     VI,  13|         exceeds the evil of false opinion; accordingly the product
32   VIII,  1 |         of upsetting the received opinion unless they have some positive
33   VIII,  5 |         defending some one else’s opinion, then clearly it will be
34   VIII,  11|    convert any one to a different opinion should do so in a dialectical
35   VIII,  11|           the other hand, general opinion be for the one and neither
36   VIII,  11|           showing (e.g.) that one opinion is more properly so called
37   VIII,  11|     genuinely exists an object of opinion in itself": therefore "the
38   VIII,  11|           more fully an object of opinion than the particular objects
39   VIII,  11|         the particular objects of opinion". Now "a relative term is
40   VIII,  11| opinion-in-itself, which will be "opinion" in a more accurate sense
41   VIII,  11|           therefore "this will be opinion in a more accurate sense".
42   VIII,  12|      entirely contrary to general opinion, clearly it is bad, either
43   VIII,  13|           on the level of general opinion must be given now.~People