Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |     whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally
 2      I,  1 |     again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or
 3      I,  1 | reasoning", since it appears to reason, but does not really do
 4      I,  15|       in unawares, and for this reason the definitions also should
 5      I,  17|      sight is in the eye, so is reason in the soul, and as is a
 6     II,  5 |      art of dialectic. For this reason, moreover, the answerer
 7     II,  5 |        and capable of acquiring reason and knowledge, so that by
 8    III,  6 |         then it will follow, by reason of the hypothesis, that
 9      V,  1 |   latter is produced in that of reason alone, and in those who
10      V,  1 |      one such as the faculty of reason possesses in comparison
11      V,  2 |       property of "animal". The reason why the term you use, or
12      V,  4 |        rarefied particles". The reason why the subject will not
13      V,  5 |        for simply and solely by reason of his being in a certain
14      V,  5 |       of different species. The reason why, whenever "specifically"
15      V,  8 |      property of the faculty of reason, and desiring is not a property
16      V,  8 |      property of the faculty of reason. For constructive purposes,
17      V,  8 |     property of "the faculty of reason" to be "the primary seat
18      V,  8 |      property of the faculty of reason to be the primary seat of
19     VI,  4 |      more intelligible. For the reason why the definition is rendered
20     VI,  9 |     been deceived, and for this reason we do not talk of inanimate
21     VI,  11| ridiculous: because there is no reason why the most familiar term
22     VI,  12|         things. For there is no reason why the same thing should
23    VII,  3 |      the bare statement that to reason to a thing’s definition
24    VII,  5 |   premisses it is impossible to reason to a definition; for if
25    VII,  5 |    establish it is necessary to reason to them all. Then, too,
26   VIII,  1 |         the grounds on which we reason to them.~It is a useful
27   VIII,  1 |   fallacy is obscured. For this reason also a questioner sometimes
28   VIII,  2 |      Whenever it is possible to reason to the same conclusion either
29   VIII,  2 |        the other hand, one does reason to an impossible conclusion,
30   VIII,  2 |       is not possible. For this reason questions of this kind are
31   VIII,  2 |        in the other he fails to reason: for reasoning always consists
32   VIII,  3 |         principles; or else the reason is that we have yet to discover
33   VIII,  3 |        hand, it be essential to reason through premisses that are
34   VIII,  6 |       conclusion clearly do not reason correctly: hence, when men
35   VIII,  8 |  stadium;-but still, this is no reason for omitting to assert the
36   VIII,  10|        10~Of all arguments that reason to a false conclusion the
37   VIII,  10|         be a falsehood, but the reason of the fallacy should also
38   VIII,  11| examination, clearly one has to reason not only to true conclusions,
39   VIII,  11|        as a geometrician should reason geometrically, whether his
40   VIII,  11|    previously denied; for which reason they often assent, when
41   VIII,  14|     particular arguments really reason universally, as well, i.e.
42   VIII,  14|     because it is impossible to reason at all without using universals.~