Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  13|    either the honourable or the pleasant or the expedient"; and (
 2     II,  8 |      that "If the honourable is pleasant, what is not pleasant is
 3     II,  8 |        is pleasant, what is not pleasant is not honourable, while
 4     II,  8 | Likewise, also, "If what is not pleasant be not honourable, then
 5     II,  8 |      then what is honourable is pleasant". Clearly, then, the conversion
 6     II,  9 |         good is not necessarily pleasant; for neither is evil painful:
 7    III,  3 |    which of the two is the more pleasant or more honourable or more
 8    III,  6 |    cases good. Also, if what is pleasant is in some cases objectionable,
 9    III,  6 |     principle, also, if what is pleasant is in some cases beneficial,
10     IV,  4 |       e.g.) the relation of the pleasant to pleasure is like that
11     IV,  4 |        of "good", then also the pleasant will be a kind of "useful":
12     IV,  4 |        of Accident: e.g. if the pleasant be a kind of good, what
13     IV,  4 |         what is not good is not pleasant. For were this no something
14     IV,  4 |      good as well would then be pleasant. That, however, cannot be,
15     IV,  4 |       if "good" be the genus of pleasant, that anything not good
16     IV,  4 |     anything not good should be pleasant: for of things of which
17     IV,  4 |         what is not good be not pleasant, then what is pleasant is
18     IV,  4 |      not pleasant, then what is pleasant is good, so that "good"
19     IV,  4 |          good" is the genus of "pleasant".~If the species be a relative
20     VI,  3 |          is a "conation for the pleasant". For "desire" is always "
21     VI,  3 |      desire" is always "for the pleasant", so that what is the same
22     VI,  3 |    desire will also be "for the pleasant". Accordingly our definition
23     VI,  3 |     both alike will be "for the pleasant". Or perhaps there is no
24     VI,  3 |     that is said to be "for the pleasant", but rather the whole idea,
25     VI,  7 |      the beautiful’ is "what is pleasant to the eyes or to the ears":
26     VI,  7 |         real and not real. For "pleasant to the ears" will be the
27     VI,  7 |        beautiful", so that "not pleasant to the ears" will be the
28     VI,  7 |       not beautiful", while of "pleasant to the ears" the opposite
29     VI,  7 |       ears" the opposite is not pleasant to the cars’: clearly, then, "
30     VI,  7 |      cars’: clearly, then, "not pleasant to the ears" is the same
31     VI,  7 |         therefore, something be pleasant to the eyes but not to the
32     VI,  8 |      that desire is not for the pleasant but for pleasure: for this
33     VI,  8 |     purpose in choosing what is pleasant as well.~Look and see also
34     VI,  8 |         is a conation after the pleasant"-instead of saying "the
35     VI,  8 |       the apparently good", or "pleasant". For often those who exhibit
36     VI,  8 |        perceive what is good or pleasant, so that their aim need
37     VI,  8 |      need not be really good or pleasant, but only apparently so.
38     VI,  8 |    desire is for the absolutely pleasant, and absolute wishing is
39     VI,  8 |  apparent good or an apparently pleasant: for the existence of an
40     VI,  8 |   absolutely-apparently-good or pleasant would be an absurdity.~
41     VI,  9 |        of the kind. Thus if the pleasant be identical with the beneficial,