Book, Paragraph

 1     II,  3|                   rule holds true also of desire and all other terms that
 2     II,  3|                 than one object. For the "desire of X" may mean the desire
 3     II,  3|                 desire of X" may mean the desire of it as an end (e.g. the
 4     II,  3|                 of it as an end (e.g. the desire of health) or as a means
 5     II,  3|                 means to an end (e.g. the desire of being doctored), or as
 6     II,  3|                 no longer desires it. His desire for it is therefore accidental.
 7     II,  7|              asserted that the faculty of desire is ignorant. For if it were
 8     II,  7|                  mean that the faculty of desire is capable of knowledge.
 9    III,  1|               latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should
10    III,  1|                turn of expression. For we desire justice in our friends for
11    III,  1|                 whereas in our enemies we desire it for something else, in
12    III,  2|              health alone, inasmuch as we desire recovery of health for the
13    III,  3|           character that a man might well desire and object to it alike is
14      V,  1|                   comparison with that of desire and spirit, in that the
15      V,  1|                   command, nor is that of desire and spirit always under
16      V,  6|                  virtue of the faculty of desire".~Next, look from the point
17      V,  8|                property of the faculty of desire as reasoning’ is a property
18      V,  8|                property of the faculty of desire, reasoning could not be
19      V,  8|                  it is of "the faculty of desire" to be "the primary seat
20      V,  8|                property of the faculty of desire to be the primary seat of
21     VI,  3|                 than once, saying (e.g.) "desire" is a "conation for the
22     VI,  3|                   for the pleasant". For "desire" is always "for the pleasant",
23     VI,  3|                  that what is the same as desire will also be "for the pleasant".
24     VI,  3|             Accordingly our definition of desire becomes "conation-for-the-pleasant":
25     VI,  3| conation-for-the-pleasant": for the word "desire" is the exact equivalent
26     VI,  3|             Likewise also in the case of "desire" as well: for it is not "
27     VI,  7|             suppose sexual love to be the desire for intercourse: for he
28     VI,  7|               love has not a more intense desire for intercourse, so that
29     VI,  8|               should be stated, e.g. that desire is not for the pleasant
30     VI,  8|             conation after the good", or "desire is a conation after the
31     VI,  8|                 to an Idea: thus absolute desire is for the absolutely pleasant,
32    VII,  1|                love, so that love and the desire for intercourse are not
33    VII,  3|                 If, on the other hand, we desire to establish one, the first
34   VIII,  1|                   this, that "anger" is a desire for vengeance on account
35   VIII,  1|                  the "angry man" does not desire vengeance, because we become
36   VIII,  1|                our parents, but we do not desire vengeance on them. Very