Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  5 |         preferable?" and "Is the life of virtue or the life of
 2      I,  5 |        the life of virtue or the life of self-indulgence the pleasanter?",
 3      I,  14|           e.g. "On Good", or "On Life"-and that "On Good" should
 4    III,  1 |      directed towards the end of life is more desirable than a
 5    III,  2 |  desirable as well: for the good life is better than mere life,
 6    III,  2 |         life is better than mere life, and good life is a superfluity,
 7    III,  2 |         than mere life, and good life is a superfluity, whereas
 8    III,  2 |        superfluity, whereas mere life itself is a necessity. Sometimes,
 9    III,  2 |         lacks the necessities of life. The expression "superfluity"
10    III,  2 |     possesses the necessities of life and sets to work to secure
11     IV,  3 |          the soul has a share in life, while it is impossible
12     IV,  5 |       immortality is everlasting life: for immortality seems to
13     IV,  5 |         or accidental feature of life. That this saying is true
14     IV,  5 |     assert that he takes another life, but that a certain accidental
15     IV,  5 |      this one as it is. So then "life" is not the genus of immortality.~
16      V,  5 |        fire", or absolutely, as "life" to "living being", or one
17      V,  5 |  partakes of something else, as "life" belongs to a particular
18      V,  5 |       e.g.) if he were to state "life" to be a property of a "
19      V,  8 |   property of a higher degree of life, a lower degree of sensation
20      V,  8 |    property of a lower degree of life, and the highest of the
21      V,  8 |          and sensation simply of life simply.~Also you should
22      V,  8 |        property of "animal" than life’, and "sensation" is a property
23      V,  8 |        is a property of animal, "life" would be a property of
24     VI,  10|        Dionysius’ definition of "life" when stated as "a movement
25     VI,  10|          as in animals, whereas "life" is generally understood
26     VI,  10|   possible to hold the view that life is a synonymous term and
27    VII,  1 | Xenocrates argues that the happy life and the good life are the
28    VII,  1 |          happy life and the good life are the same, seeing that
29    VII,  1 |      seeing that of all forms of life the good life is the most
30    VII,  1 |       all forms of life the good life is the most desirable and
31    VII,  1 |         and so also is the happy life: for "the most desirable"
32    VII,  1 |          his case: for the happy life is not numerically single,
33    VII,  1 |         single, nor yet the good life, so that it does not follow