Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  1 |     shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted
 2      I,  1 | dialectical", if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted.
 3      I,  1 |         On the other hand, those opinions are "generally accepted"
 4      I,  1 |   contentious" if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally
 5      I,  1 |      merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally
 6      I,  1 |     accepted. For in none of the opinions which we call generally
 7      I,  1 |   definition; he does not assume opinions that are received either
 8      I,  2 |      when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we
 9      I,  2 |          else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular
10      I,  10|        it be not contrary to the opinions of most men. Dialectical
11      I,  10|     contradict the contraries of opinions that are taken to be generally
12      I,  10| generally accepted, and also all opinions that are in accordance with
13      I,  10|        the contraries of general opinions will pass as general opinions:
14      I,  10|    opinions will pass as general opinions: for if it be a general
15      I,  10|    contraries. Clearly also, all opinions that are in accordance with
16      I,  11|          contrary to men’s usual opinions would be silly. Or it may
17      I,  11|          contrary to men’s usual opinions, e.g. the view maintained
18      I,  14|       may first take in hand the opinions held by all or by most men
19      I,  14|         most notable of them; or opinions contrary to those that seem
20      I,  14|  generally held; and, again, all opinions that are in accordance with
21      I,  14|        of the contradictories of opinions contrary to those that seem
22      I,  14|         selecting not only those opinions that actually are accepted,
23      I,  14|         should indicate also the opinions of individual thinkers,
24   VIII,  5 |       too, who introduce other’s opinions, e.g. that "good and evil
25   VIII,  8 |      that are contrary to common opinions, whose solution is yet difficult,
26   VIII,  11|         to accept his point from opinions that are as generally received
27   VIII,  11|        sense than the particular opinions": and it has been postulated