Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  18|     cases that are alike that we claim to bring the universal in
 2     II,  2 |     number of cases, we may then claim that the other should actually
 3     II,  3 |      universally, supposing this claim to be a plausible one. For
 4    III,  6 |         opinion grants alike the claim that if all pleasure be
 5    III,  6 |        all pain is evil, and the claim that if some pleasure be
 6    III,  6 |        an hypothesis; you should claim that the attribute, if it
 7    III,  6 |      adducing several instances, claim that he should either admit
 8     IV,  6 | supposing A and B to have a like claim to be genus, then if one
 9     IV,  6 |           also, if what has less claim be a genus, so also is what
10     IV,  6 |         so also is what has more claim: e.g. if "capacity" have
11     IV,  6 |          if "capacity" have more claim than "virtue" to be the
12     IV,  6 | supposing A and B to have a like claim to be a species of the genus
13    VII,  3 |          A of a. Further, if A’s claim to define a is like B’s
14   VIII,  2 |          One ought, moreover, to claim that the objections should
15   VIII,  2 |      objection to bring, you may claim that he shall admit it:
16   VIII,  3 |        to refuse to admit it and claim that you shall argue to
17   VIII,  11|      proposed view.~One must not claim that the reasoning to a
18   VIII,  13|    contraries is one and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites
19   VIII,  13|          to disease, and were to claim first the one, then the
20   VIII,  13|          suppose any one were to claim something universally and
21   VIII,  13|    contraries is one, he were to claim that the knowledge of what