Book, Paragraph

 1      I,  3 |      that kind: this means the doing of that which we choose
 2      I,  10|        might appear also as if doing good to one’s friends were
 3      I,  10|     friends were a contrary to doing evil to one’s enemies: but
 4     II,  7 |       any contrariety; for the doing of good to friends is not
 5     II,  7 | friends is not contrary to the doing of evil to enemies: for
 6     II,  7 |        disposition. Nor is the doing of evil to friends contrary
 7     II,  7 |        friends contrary to the doing of good to enemies: for
 8     II,  7 |     friends is contrary to the doing of evil to friends: for
 9     II,  7 |     than one contrary. For the doing of good to friends has as
10     II,  7 |       as its contrary both the doing of good to enemies and the
11     II,  7 |        good to enemies and the doing of evil to friends. Likewise,
12    III,  2 |      e.g. just dealing and the doing of good rather than the
13    III,  3 |    that it were his by his own doing is more desirable than what
14    III,  3 |        rather get by another’s doing, e.g. friends than money.
15     IV,  1 | essence, but rather a state of doing or of having something done
16     IV,  5 |        good man are capable of doing bad things, but that is
17     IV,  5 |        even the capacities for doing bad things are desirable,
18     IV,  5 |        are capable (we say) of doing evil. So then "capacity"
19   VIII,  2 |        but also if, without so doing, he refuses to admit the