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 1     Int,      II|    distinguish the true from the false, and the determination of
 2     Int,      IV|          Atticus admitted, to be false. I may note, as of some
 3     Int,      IV|       which was supported by the false notion, found as early as
 4     Not,       1|    spelling percunctari rests on false derivation (Corss. I. 36).
 5     Not,       1|          the case of pulcher the false derivation from πολυχροος
 6     Not,       1|         sensations into true and false. I believe that we have
 7     Not,       1|          said the Stoics, from a false judgment about some external
 8     Not,       2|      these ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds
 9     Not,       2|         action might prove to be false? (23) How can wisdom be
10     Not,       2|          undestructibly true and false." This being so, the statements
11     Not,       2|     distinguish between true and false, and on the other hold that
12     Not,       2|  distinguishing between true and false is possible (33). This is
13     Not,       2|          which is still possibly false is useless (36).~§30. Physicis:
14     Not,       2|         between the true and the false while you do away with the
15     Not,       2|      with the notion of true and false altogether." The discussion
16     Not,       2|         in whose vision true and false are confused." Cf. κοινη
17     Not,       2|          are partly true, partly false, the false cannot of course
18     Not,       2|          true, partly false, the false cannot of course be real
19     Not,       2|       always of a form which the false may assume. Now sensations
20     Not,       2|       are indistinguishable from false cannot be partly perceptions,
21     Not,       2|        are universally made, (1) false sensations cannot be perceptions, (
22     Not,       2|       are indistinguishable from false, cannot be partly perceptions,
23     Not,       2|          are partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which
24     Not,       2|      Again to say that there are false sensations is to say that
25     Not,       2|     themselves, might be true or false, but affirmed that human
26     Not,       2|         which a sensation may be false, (1) it may come from one
27     Not,       2|   efficere) sensations which are false, but probable (as the Stoics
28     Not,       2|       why can he not manufacture false sensations which are so
29     Not,       2|        Probabilia, then, denotes false sensations such as have
30     Not,       2|         sunt, etc.: if there are false sensations which are probable (
31     Not,       2|          why should there not be false sensations so probable as
32     Not,       2|      similarity between true and false sensations does not logically
33     Not,       2|         between the true and the false (50). We contend that these
34     Not,       2|     distinguish between true and false visa. Lucullus answers that,
35     Not,       2|       The doctrine that true and false sensations are indistinguishable
36     Not,       2| disgraceful to assent to what is false. I do not deny that I make
37     Not,       2|     distinguish between true and false (67). Even if it be so the
38     Not,       2|        from the sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (
39     Not,       2|       has side by side with it a false one indistinguishable from
40     Not,       2|      acervo tritici: this is the false sorites, which may be briefly
41     Not,       2|       possibility of their being false. The Stoics themselves admit
42     Not,       2|          that there are true and false visa and then contradict
43     Not,       2|      difference between true and false, is absurd. We do not deny
44     Not,       2|       true and the existent, the false and the non existent, hence
45     Not,       2|       i.e. the probably true and false. Probandi species: a phenomenal