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 1     Not,       1|      information can be got from sensation, whereas, as we shall see
 2     Not,       1|         In dialectic he analysed sensation into two parts, an impulse
 3     Not,       1|      irrefragably the truth of a sensation he called it Knowledge,
 4     Not,       1|          within it all powers of sensation and thought. These notions
 5     Not,       1|      with notes) For his view of sensation and thought see Sextus Adv.
 6     Not,       1|     account of Stoic theories of sensation is given by Zeller, ch.
 7     Not,       1|   important passage). The actual sensation is involuntary (ακουσιον
 8     Not,       1|         see in the Lucullus, the sensation and the thing from which
 9     Not,       2| forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration (‛
10     Not,       2|         definition of the single sensation. Knowledge, it was thought,
11     Not,       2|      maintain the truth of every sensation, Epicurus must see to that.
12     Not,       2|          2) an individual act of sensation. Deus: for the supposed
13     Not,       2|       see 79, 80. Epic. held all sensation, per se, to be infallible.
14     Not,       2|          the assumption that the sensation corresponds to the thing
15     Not,       2|      ηρξε Στρατον. All powers of sensation with the Stoics, who are
16     Not,       2|        The merely πιθανη is that sensation which at first sight, without
17     Not,       2|       A.M. VII. 167—175). Now no sensation is perceived alone; the
18     Not,       2|          therefore deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to
19     Not,       2|          It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the assent
20     Not,       2|          a general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different
21     Not,       2|       not. There is therefore no sensation which is also a perception (
22     Not,       2|          partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a reality,
23     Not,       2|          mean "a certainly known sensation."]~§40. Quasi fundamenta:
24     Not,       2|          distinguish clearly the sensation (visum) from the thing which
25     Not,       2|      could only pierce through a sensation and arrive at its source,
26     Not,       2|      tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do
27     Not,       2|          is wrong to assume that sensation and thing correspond. Cf.
28     Not,       2|       150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see n. on 79, 80.~§§46—48.
29     Not,       2|         they urge that a phantom sensation produces very often the
30     Not,       2|          are two ways in which a sensation may be false, (1) it may
31     Not,       2|          inference only from the sensation can be false, not the sensation
32     Not,       2|  sensation can be false, not the sensation itself (79, 80). I wish
33     Not,       2|    disputed viz. that every true sensation has side by side with it
34     Not,       2|          is enough. One mistaken sensation will throw all the others
35     Not,       2|      condemns those who say that sensation is swept away by the Academy;
36     Not,       2|  Academic and other schools each sensation was an ultimate unanalysable