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Part, Question
1501 1, 78 | are intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible
1502 1, 78 | with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the ~passive
1503 1, 78 | in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those
1504 1, 78 | operation; since through one thing understood, other things
1505 1, 78 | Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a ~condition of a
1506 1, 78 | exists. ~Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists
1507 1, 78 | actually, the species of that thing ceases ~to be in our intellect,
1508 1, 78 | wish to understand that thing anew, we ~must turn to the
1509 1, 78 | is identified ~with each thing as knowing it, it is said
1510 1, 78 | intellect is said to be each thing, ~inasmuch as it receives
1511 1, 78 | intelligible species of each thing. To the ~fact, therefore,
1512 1, 78 | sensed some past sensible thing. But as ~concerns the intellectual
1513 1, 78 | defined in reference to that thing to which it is ~directed
1514 1, 78 | reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so
1515 1, 78 | need to ~advance from one thing to another; but apprehend
1516 1, 78 | truth by advancing from one ~thing to another; and therefore
1517 1, 78 | since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a ~certain
1518 1, 78 | were, ~a movement from one thing to another. But the same
1519 1, 78 | another. But the same movable thing passes ~through the medium
1520 1, 78 | parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And ~so far
1521 1, 78 | which ~is about a certain thing is called intention; that
1522 1, 78 | for it is accidental to a thing colored to be ~man, or to
1523 1, 78 | power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect,
1524 1, 78 | for conscience is not one thing but many, since ~we are
1525 1, 78 | as a subject, but ~as the thing known is in knowledge; so
1526 1, 79 | some particular desirable thing - namely its ~own suitable
1527 1, 79 | found to ~determine each thing only to its own being -
1528 1, 79 | differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something ~
1529 1, 79 | appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the ~intellectual
1530 1, 79 | is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: ~wherefore
1531 1, 79 | is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended ~
1532 1, 79 | Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of ~themselves
1533 1, 80 | in the very fact that the thing ~apprehended is in the one
1534 1, 80 | desires is borne ~towards the thing desirable. Therefore the
1535 1, 80 | Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But
1536 1, 81 | is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it
1537 1, 81 | In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by
1538 1, 81 | the part of the agent, a thing must be, when ~someone is
1539 1, 81 | against the inclination of a thing. But the ~very movement
1540 1, 81 | something. Therefore, as a ~thing is called natural because
1541 1, 81 | inclination of ~nature, so a thing is called voluntary because
1542 1, 81 | as it is impossible for a thing ~to be at the same time
1543 1, 81 | it is impossible for a ~thing to be absolutely coerced
1544 1, 81 | matters. For what befits a thing naturally ~and immovably
1545 1, 81 | thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything,
1546 1, 81 | so far as it desires a thing naturally, ~corresponds
1547 1, 81 | will as the ~mover to the thing movable. But the movement
1548 1, 81 | 1~OBJ 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is
1549 1, 81 | sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect
1550 1, 81 | necessity causes movement in the thing ~movable, when the power
1551 1, 81 | of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that ~its entire
1552 1, 81 | simply apprehends some one thing. ~Therefore, according to
1553 1, 81 | Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive
1554 1, 81 | not of necessity from ~one thing.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[82] A[
1555 1, 81 | The superiority of one thing over another can be ~considered
1556 1, 81 | and "relatively." Now a thing is ~considered to be such
1557 1, 81 | and the more abstract a thing is, the ~nobler and higher
1558 1, 81 | that the ~idea of the thing understood is in the one
1559 1, 81 | will is inclined to the thing ~itself as existing in itself.
1560 1, 81 | mind." When, therefore, the thing in which there ~is good
1561 1, 81 | by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than
1562 1, 81 | intellect. ~But when the thing which is good is less noble
1563 1, 81 | in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher
1564 1, 81 | perceived by comparing one thing ~to another, and in such
1565 1, 81 | forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth ~its end. And
1566 1, 81 | for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act,
1567 1, 81 | motive power precedes ~the thing movable, and as the active
1568 1, 81 | not, as we list." But a thing is in our power by ~the
1569 1, 81 | Para. 1/1~I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways:
1570 1, 81 | it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an ~agent,
1571 1, 81 | being and truth, and as a thing and a ~particular power
1572 1, 81 | and the ~intellect as a thing and a special power; then
1573 1, 81 | sight regards the visible thing under the common notion
1574 1, 82 | seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be ~shunned, from a natural
1575 1, 82 | natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment
1576 1, 82 | itself, as ~neither for one thing to be cause of another need
1577 1, 82 | the cause of this very ~thing in them; for He operates
1578 1, 82 | for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.~
1579 1, 82 | man is inclined to one thing rather than to another.
1580 1, 82 | certain ~comparison of one thing to another, which belongs
1581 1, 82 | because we can take one thing while refusing another; ~
1582 1, 82 | required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another:
1583 1, 82 | that {thelesis} is one thing ~and {boulesis} another.
1584 1, 82 | speaking, is to come ~from one thing to the knowledge of another:
1585 1, 83 | thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity
1586 1, 83 | the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed
1587 1, 83 | observed that ~the form of the thing understood is in the intellect
1588 1, 83 | conditioned ~differently in the thing which is external to the
1589 1, 83 | thought that the form of the thing known is in the ~knower
1590 1, 83 | the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists however ~
1591 1, 83 | in ~potentiality. But a thing is not known according as
1592 1, 83 | were ~necessary for the thing known to exist materially
1593 1, 83 | by matter the form of a ~thing is determined to some one
1594 1, 83 | is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that ~
1595 1, 83 | the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the
1596 1, 83 | receives the form of the thing ~known, the more perfect
1597 1, 83 | receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, ~
1598 1, 83 | the principle of action, a thing must be ~related to the
1599 1, 83 | some hindrance, as a light thing may ~be hindered from moving
1600 1, 83 | the natural operation of a thing be ~totally hindered by
1601 1, 83 | understanding, participates the thing ~understood: for, in a way,
1602 1, 83 | intellect in act is the thing understood ~in act. Therefore
1603 1, 83 | he adopted it: and those ~thing which he found contrary
1604 1, 83 | we must reply that one thing is said to be ~known in
1605 1, 83 | eternal types. Secondly, on thing is said to be ~known in
1606 1, 83 | xii, 16): "We must not ~thing that the body can make any
1607 1, 83 | is proportioned to ~the thing known. Wherefore the proper
1608 1, 83 | a stone or any material thing cannot be ~known completely
1609 1, 83 | likeness of an individual thing; ~wherefore the imagination
1610 1, 83 | understand truth by considering a thing of which we ~possess the
1611 1, 83 | the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect ~judgment
1612 1, 83 | all that pertains ~to that thing's nature be known; especially
1613 1, 84 | may understand that one thing does not ~exist in some
1614 1, 84 | thus we understand one thing ~without considering the
1615 1, 84 | the species of a material thing, such as a ~stone, or a
1616 1, 84 | false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is,
1617 1, 84 | otherwise" refers to the thing understood; for the intellect ~
1618 1, 84 | false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is;
1619 1, 84 | the same as the mode of ~a thing in existing: since the thing
1620 1, 84 | thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially
1621 1, 84 | to the mode of a material thing.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[85] A[
1622 1, 84 | the species of a natural thing is a ~form only, and that
1623 1, 84 | the species of a ~natural thing from the individual sensible
1624 1, 84 | specific conditions only, the thing reflected in ~the phantasm.
1625 1, 84 | judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression
1626 1, 84 | heater is a likeness of the ~thing heated; so the form from
1627 1, 84 | likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the
1628 1, 84 | and the likeness of the thing ~understood, that is, the
1629 1, 84 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: The thing understood is in the intellect
1630 1, 84 | sense that we say that the thing actually ~understood is
1631 1, 84 | because the likeness of the thing ~understood is the form
1632 1, 84 | likeness of a sensible ~thing is the form of the sense
1633 1, 84 | OBJ 2: In these words "the thing actually understood" there
1634 1, 84 | double implication - the thing which is understood, and
1635 1, 84 | things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. ~
1636 1, 84 | itself an image of an ~absent thing, or even of something never
1637 1, 84 | as ~it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known,
1638 1, 84 | proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to ~
1639 1, 84 | in it, is to ~know that thing confusedly. In this way
1640 1, 84 | reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it ~is
1641 1, 84 | because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state
1642 1, 84 | definition are known before ~the thing defined is known; otherwise
1643 1, 84 | is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be ~known
1644 1, 84 | that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species ~
1645 1, 84 | comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it
1646 1, 84 | understanding is of ~one thing only, knowledge is of many."~
1647 1, 84 | comparison between ~one thing and another, it knows both
1648 1, 84 | necessarily compares one thing with ~another by composition
1649 1, 84 | the entire knowledge of a thing at once and ~perfectly;
1650 1, 84 | knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at ~once whatever
1651 1, 84 | OBJ 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect ~
1652 1, 84 | according to the mode of the ~thing. Wherefore something on
1653 1, 84 | something on the part of the thing corresponds to the ~composition
1654 1, 84 | the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of
1655 1, 84 | the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under ~the
1656 1, 84 | imagination. Now in a material thing ~there is a twofold composition.
1657 1, 84 | predicates the composition of one thing with another.~~Aquin.: SMT
1658 1, 84 | fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his ~
1659 1, 84 | quiddity" of a material thing; ~and hence, properly speaking,
1660 1, 84 | the surroundings of ~the thing in its essence or quiddity,
1661 1, 84 | quiddity, in referring one thing to another, ~as regards
1662 1, 84 | instance, the definition ~of a thing is false in relation to
1663 1, 84 | consideration of the quiddity ~of a thing, and of those things which
1664 1, 84 | understand one and the same thing better than ~another can?~
1665 1, 84 | understand one and the same ~thing better than another can.
1666 1, 84 | Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is,
1667 1, 84 | degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one person understand
1668 1, 84 | one person understand a thing ~better than another can."~
1669 1, 84 | equality between thought and thing, is not subject ~to more
1670 1, 84 | to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more
1671 1, 84 | less equal. ~Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.~
1672 1, 84 | Para. 1/2~I answer that, A thing being understood more by
1673 1, 84 | understanding as regards the thing understood; and ~thus, one
1674 1, 84 | cannot understand the same thing more than another, because
1675 1, 84 | may understand the same thing better than someone ~else,
1676 1, 84 | just as a man may ~see a thing better with his bodily sight,
1677 1, 84 | intellect understanding a thing as it is.~Aquin.: SMT FP
1678 1, 84 | Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known ~
1679 1, 84 | quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from
1680 1, 84 | the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on ~
1681 1, 85 | The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the ~conclusion
1682 1, 85 | the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things
1683 1, 85 | considering successively one thing ~after another: because
1684 1, 85 | proper to a ~contingent thing sometime to be and sometime
1685 1, 85 | since every ~contingent thing has in it something necessary:
1686 1, 86 | ix, Did. viii, 9): for a thing ~is a being, and is true,
1687 1, 86 | the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident
1688 1, 86 | is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel
1689 1, 86 | of the ~likeness of the thing understood, which is the
1690 1, 86 | understood are the same." ~For a thing is actually understood in
1691 1, 86 | whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still ~more
1692 1, 86 | the nature ~of a material thing as stated above (Q[84],
1693 1, 86 | whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is ~still more
1694 1, 86 | stated above (AA[1],2) a thing is intelligible ~according
1695 1, 86 | is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in
1696 1, 86 | 8. ~Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect
1697 1, 86 | one and the same act is a thing, together with its ~perfection,
1698 1, 86 | the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which
1699 1, 86 | nature of the ~material thing and intelligent act could
1700 1, 86 | understood by one act; just ~as a thing and its perfection are understood
1701 1, 86 | Now ~the inclination of a thing resides in it according
1702 1, 86 | inclination resides in a natural thing ~naturally, and the inclination
1703 1, 86 | appetite is in the ~sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the
1704 1, 86 | as ~the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle,
1705 1, 86 | contains ~some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine
1706 1, 87 | as it is a much greater thing to ~understand separate
1707 1, 87 | that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower,
1708 1, 87 | through any other material thing, ~because there is no proportion
1709 1, 87 | judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is
1710 1, 87 | Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But
1711 1, 87 | quiddity of a material thing," which is the proper object
1712 1, 87 | axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so," ~
1713 1, 88 | the body is an accidental thing, ~for, on the contrary,
1714 1, 88 | De Causis viii): for a thing is understood ~according
1715 1, 88 | who understands; while one thing is in ~another according
1716 1, 88 | intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety ~may
1717 1, 88 | itself, because so far as a thing ~falls short of being, so
1718 1, 89 | substance, but an extraneous ~thing.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[90] A[
1719 1, 89 | the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way
1720 1, 90 | perfect than an imperfect thing.~Aquin.: SMT FP Q[91] A[
1721 1, 91 | it is determined to one ~thing, it has also a determinate
1722 1, 91 | body. Now from ~a smaller thing a larger thing can be made
1723 1, 91 | a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only - either
1724 1, 91 | with the absence of the thing ~defined.~Aquin.: SMT FP
1725 1, 92 | united likeness of one ~thing adequately representing
1726 1, 92 | far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only ~
1727 1, 92 | but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately ~represents
1728 1, 92 | for though each individual thing is good, all things together
1729 1, 92 | does ~not suffice for one thing to be the image of another.
1730 1, 92 | it is the image of that thing; for ~whiteness is an accident
1731 1, 92 | it is not an accidental thing, since it is a ~substance.
1732 1, 92 | all things, but in each ~thing is adapted to the nature
1733 1, 92 | principally to the shape of a ~thing. But shape belongs to the
1734 1, 92 | them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not
1735 1, 92 | eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make
1736 1, 92 | adapted to ~each single thing, just as the good and the
1737 1, 92 | compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and
1738 1, 93 | have believed that such a ~thing was possible; which would
1739 1, 95 | whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man ~
1740 1, 96 | definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore ~as long
1741 1, 96 | Para. 1/1~I answer that, A thing may be incorruptible in
1742 1, 96 | very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in ~its
1743 1, 96 | incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on
1744 1, 96 | proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed
1745 1, 96 | passive, according as one thing changes ~another from its
1746 1, 96 | into the substance of the thing nourished. So we ~cannot
1747 1, 96 | into the ~substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the
1748 1, 97 | would have been no such thing in the state of innocence.~
1749 1, 97 | male and female. The second thing to be ~observed is a certain
1750 1, 101 | tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom ~
1751 1, 102 | nature to one ~particular thing, does not require any external
1752 1, 102 | their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate perfection consists ~
1753 1, 102 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: A thing moves or operates for an
1754 1, 102 | to the end. ~Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate
1755 1, 102 | determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression
1756 1, 102 | of the government of a ~thing is that whereto the thing
1757 1, 102 | thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought. But
1758 1, 102 | brought. But that whereto a ~thing is brought is some good
1759 1, 102 | brought is some good in the thing itself; thus a sick man
1760 1, 102 | answer that, As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning,
1761 1, 102 | and represented; for each thing tends to a participation ~
1762 1, 102 | would cease to exist. For a thing so far ~exists as it is
1763 1, 102 | and the dissolution of a thing arises from defect ~therein.
1764 1, 102 | of authorities is a ~bad thing, therefore there should
1765 1, 102 | Movement is "the act of a thing moved, caused by the ~mover."
1766 1, 102 | is the act of a ~movable thing, caused by the moving principle,
1767 1, 102 | Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if possible, ~
1768 1, 102 | greater perfection ~for a thing to be good in itself and
1769 1, 102 | From the fact that one thing opposes another, it follows ~
1770 1, 102 | it follows ~that some one thing can resist the order of
1771 1, 103 | included in the nature of a thing is ~necessarily in that
1772 1, 103 | is ~necessarily in that thing, and its contrary cannot
1773 1, 103 | we must consider that a thing ~is preserved by another
1774 1, 103 | corruption. Secondly, ~a thing is said to preserve another '
1775 1, 103 | Therefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that
1776 1, 103 | neither ~can the "being" of a thing continue after that action
1777 1, 103 | Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than
1778 1, 103 | 1/1~On the contrary, A thing is kept in being by that
1779 1, 103 | As stated above (A[1]), a thing keeps another in being ~
1780 1, 103 | And in both ways a created thing keeps ~another in being.
1781 1, 103 | generated; for when one thing is generated another undergoes ~
1782 1, 103 | Therefore God cannot cause a thing to tend ~to non-existence,
1783 1, 104 | determinate being of a particular ~thing is from its own form. Therefore
1784 1, 104 | wherefore if a composite thing be ~produced, it is likened
1785 1, 104 | generating a ~composite thing like itself; so also can
1786 1, 104 | namely, the likeness of ~the thing understood in the one who
1787 1, 104 | one who understands. So a thing is said to ~move the intellect,
1788 1, 104 | him the likeness of the thing understood.~Aquin.: SMT
1789 1, 104 | with the likeness of the ~thing understood is a sufficient
1790 1, 104 | nothing can move a movable ~thing sufficiently unless the
1791 1, 104 | the potentiality of the thing movable. Now the potentiality ~
1792 1, 104 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 1: A thing moved by another is forced
1793 1, 104 | of the operation of the thing ~made, as giving it the
1794 1, 104 | by the ~end, which is the thing wrought, for instance a
1795 1, 104 | And since the form ~of a thing is within the thing, and
1796 1, 104 | of a thing is within the thing, and all the more, as it
1797 1, 104 | That is natural to each thing ~which is caused by Him
1798 1, 104 | unknown to others. Wherefore a thing is wonderful to ~one man,
1799 1, 104 | Reply OBJ 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not
1800 1, 104 | of the ~excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but
1801 1, 104 | faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual, not because
1802 1, 104 | of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be above the
1803 1, 104 | of the substance of the thing done, but also ~on account
1804 1, 104 | grain of a balance." But a thing ~is called a miracle by
1805 1, 104 | among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature,
1806 1, 104 | in miracles. Thirdly, ~a thing surpasses nature's power
1807 1, 105 | and the likeness of ~the thing understood; in both of these
1808 1, 105 | spiritual things, for one thing to turn to another, corresponds ~
1809 1, 105 | regards the likeness of the thing understood. For the ~superior
1810 1, 105 | inclination of the willer ~to the thing willed. And He alone can
1811 1, 105 | master ~understands the same thing better than the pupil who
1812 1, 106 | something else. Now one thing is ordered to another ~in
1813 1, 106 | the purpose of giving one thing to ~another, as in natural
1814 1, 106 | will. In another way one thing is ordered ~to another to
1815 1, 106 | his will to another. Now a thing can be ordered ~through
1816 1, 106 | through some cause to one thing and not to another; consequently
1817 1, 107 | definition is multiplied, the thing defined is also ~multiplied.
1818 1, 107 | communicate it; as the hot thing which can ~communicate heat
1819 1, 107 | it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many, which ~
1820 1, 107 | whereas he ~who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can
1821 1, 107 | way of participation. A thing is said to be in another
1822 1, 107 | place ~accordingly as the thing known is in the knower;
1823 1, 108 | will it is not a sacred thing, because ~they abuse their
1824 1, 108 | follows the nature of a thing, where natures ~are subordinate,
1825 1, 109 | qu. 79): "Every visible thing in this world has an angelic
1826 1, 109 | stone upwards, as ~such a thing is outside the order of
1827 1, 110 | inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus
1828 1, 111 | universe, but reaches ~to one thing in such a way as not to
1829 1, 112 | God: for in as far as a thing participates being, so far
1830 1, 112 | universally speaking, such a thing would not be ~voluntary:
1831 1, 113 | assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the ~suggestion
1832 1, 113 | 1/3~I answer that, One thing can be the cause of another
1833 1, 113 | 3] Body Para. 2/3~But a thing is said to be the direct
1834 1, 113 | can clothe any corporeal thing with ~any corporeal form,
1835 1, 114 | For in proportion as a thing is ~participated, so, of
1836 1, 114 | matter subject to quantity, a thing owes ~its being an agent
1837 1, 114 | contrary, the heavier a thing, the greater its movement, ~
1838 1, 114 | truly one. For (that a ~thing is) "white" has a cause,
1839 1, 115 | inquiry:~(1) Is there such a thing as fate?~(2) Where is it?~(
1840 1, 115 | Whether there be such a thing as fate?~Aquin.: SMT FP
1841 1, 115 | nature terminates in some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible ~
1842 1, 115 | therefore, fate seems to be one thing only, ~it seems that fate
1843 1, 115 | clear that "the further ~a thing is from the First Mind,
1844 1, 116 | and the ~species of the thing understood. But a man cannot
1845 1, 116 | consider the ~identity of the thing known: for the same objective
1846 1, 117 | a simple and subsistent thing cannot be made except by ~
1847 1, 117 | the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that
1848 1, 117 | since the generation of one thing is the ~corruption of another,
1849 1, 117 | 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning.
1850 1, 118 | his life; since for the ~thing to be numerically the same,
1851 1, 118 | ii), "The relation ~of a thing to truth is the same as
1852 1, 118 | to the true nature of any thing which enters into the ~constitution
1853 1, 118 | common matter belong to a ~thing's true nature considered
1854 1, 118 | consist in the ~addition of a thing to itself, since of necessity
1855 1, 118 | the natural order that a thing should be reduced ~from
1856 2, 1 | effect, it would not do one thing rather than another: ~consequently
1857 2, 1 | must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its ~
1858 2, 1 | in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to the ~end,
1859 2, 1 | as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the
1860 2, 1 | Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist
1861 2, 1 | 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one
1862 2, 1 | 1/1~I answer that Each thing receives its species in
1863 2, 1 | agents the form of the ~thing generated is conformed to
1864 2, 1 | accidental to a natural thing, and conversely the relation ~
1865 2, 1 | 2) that "to suppose a ~thing to be indefinite is to deny
1866 2, 1 | while if there is no first thing among those that are ordained
1867 2, 1 | are ~clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place
1868 2, 1 | the supposition that one thing is the last end of the ~
1869 2, 1 | places its last end in one thing, ~the will does not lose
1870 2, 1 | placed its last end in ~that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could
1871 2, 1 | since nature tends to one ~thing only. But the principle
1872 2, 1 | yet it is contrary to a thing's perfect ~good, that anything
1873 2, 1 | besides be required for that thing's perfection. ~Aquin.: SMT
1874 2, 1 | secondly, considering the thing ~in which the aspect of
1875 2, 1 | above (A[5]). But as to the thing ~in which this aspect is
1876 2, 1 | nature, which tends to one thing, as stated above ~(A[5]).~
1877 2, 1 | end "by which"; viz. the thing ~itself in which is found
1878 2, 1 | or acquisition ~of that thing. Thus we say that the end
1879 2, 1 | either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place,
1880 2, 1 | of the miser is money as "thing," or possession of money
1881 2, 1 | man's last end as of the thing which is the ~end, thus
1882 2, 2 | order, to judge whether a thing is palatable.~Aquin.: SMT
1883 2, 2 | Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing known is ~related to human
1884 2, 2 | not harmonize ~with the thing: and thus good does not
1885 2, 2 | Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use ~
1886 2, 2 | many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use ~of
1887 2, 2 | Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle ~
1888 2, 2 | reasons. First, because, if a thing ~be ordained to another
1889 2, 2 | participated in this or that thing, which does not possess
1890 2, 2 | them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to
1891 2, 2 | accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is ~a mortal rational
1892 2, 2 | is that it is rest in the thing desired.~Aquin.: SMT FS
1893 2, 2 | is twofold: namely, ~the thing itself, which we desire
1894 2, 2 | attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man'
1895 2, 2 | any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, ~
1896 2, 2 | his soul. Therefore the thing ~itself which is desired
1897 2, 2 | but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. ~Consequently
1898 2, 2 | Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation
1899 2, 3 | twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to
1900 2, 3 | use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say ~
1901 2, 3 | supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in so far as
1902 2, 3 | which is ~busied with one thing, i.e. the contemplation
1903 2, 3 | Para. 1/2 ~I answer that, A thing may belong to happiness
1904 2, 3 | and not conversely, is a thing made present, ~by the fact
1905 2, 3 | sight, vision, but a visible thing. Wherefore, ~from the very
1906 2, 3 | regard to ~the principal thing known, which is His Essence,
1907 2, 3 | knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by ~something
1908 2, 3 | final perfection of each thing is for it to be ~united
1909 2, 3 | the intellect is "what a thing is," i.e. the essence of
1910 2, 3 | i.e. the essence of a ~thing, according to De Anima iii,
1911 2, 3 | it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an ~intellect
1912 2, 3 | acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired:
1913 2, 3 | and in this ~way, the same thing is the end of the higher
1914 2, 3 | the ~attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the
1915 2, 3 | respective habitudes ~to that thing. So then in the happiness
1916 2, 4 | 1/1~I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another
1917 2, 4 | are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be ~less
1918 2, 4 | perfection ~ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight
1919 2, 4 | that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet ~more
1920 2, 4 | of the goodness ~of that thing in which it reposes. If
1921 2, 4 | relation of ~the lover to the thing beloved, which relation
1922 2, 4 | threefold. For ~sometimes the thing beloved is present to the
1923 2, 4 | the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards
1924 2, 4 | the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.~Aquin.:
1925 2, 4 | even vision ~itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is
1926 2, 4 | something may belong to a thing's ~perfection in two ways.
1927 2, 4 | since operation depends on a thing's nature, the more perfect
1928 2, 4 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 4: One thing is hindered by another in
1929 2, 4 | at rest, as ~regards the thing desired; since, to wit,
1930 2, 5 | every perfection is in the thing perfected according to ~
1931 2, 5 | Now the beginning of a thing belongs to the ~same principle
1932 2, 5 | else: for instance a hot ~thing heats through heat. But
1933 2, 5 | the pupil, ~cannot make a thing white; nor indeed can everything
1934 2, 5 | because they know not in ~what thing the general notion of happiness
1935 2, 5 | happen that one and the same thing is desired in one way, and
1936 2, 6 | For since every agent or thing moved, ~acts or is moved
1937 2, 6 | end. Now in order for a ~thing to be done for an end, some
1938 2, 6 | On the other hand, if ~a thing has no knowledge of the
1939 2, 6 | for an end is not in that thing, but in something else,
1940 2, 6 | towards an end is not in that thing, ~but in something else,
1941 2, 6 | irrational ~animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "
1942 2, 6 | Therefore there is no such thing as a ~voluntary act in irrational
1943 2, 6 | not only apprehending the thing ~which is the end, but also
1944 2, 6 | proceeds from the will. Now one thing ~proceeds from another in
1945 2, 6 | inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be ~natural in
1946 2, 6 | a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according
1947 2, 6 | them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but things ~
1948 2, 6 | a cold thing, or a white thing: but things ~that are such
1949 2, 6 | big in comparison with one thing, is small ~in comparison
1950 2, 6 | comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary,
1951 2, 6 | Accordingly, nothing prevents a ~thing which was not voluntary
1952 2, 6 | voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming ~voluntary
1953 2, 6 | something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to be ~voluntary,
1954 2, 6 | it just happens that a ~thing is at the same time done,
1955 2, 7 | pertaining to ~the essence of a thing, such as the definition,
1956 2, 7 | conditions of any singular thing are ~called its individuating
1957 2, 7 | circumstances. Now what is outside a thing's ~substance, while it belongs
1958 2, 7 | while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. ~
1959 2, 7 | Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 2: A thing is said to be an accident
1960 2, 7 | First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said
1961 2, 7 | it is together with that thing in ~the same subject: thus,
1962 2, 7 | quality to human acts; for a thing ~is never qualified, formally
1963 2, 7 | accidents of acts. But one thing ~may be subject to an infinity
1964 2, 7 | the ~genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only
1965 2, 7 | which ~is inherent in the thing, but also according to that
1966 2, 7 | circumstances whether a thing is well ~or ill done. But
1967 2, 7 | 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore
1968 2, 7 | place in regard to each ~thing, is its cause and its form.
1969 2, 8 | of a person desirous of a thing towards ~that thing. Now
1970 2, 8 | of a thing towards ~that thing. Now every inclination is
1971 2, 8 | like and suitable to ~the thing inclined. Since, therefore,
1972 2, 8 | tends to good existing in a ~thing; so the animal or voluntary
1973 2, 8 | by the same power that a thing ~passes through the middle
1974 2, 8 | Topic. iii, 2) ~"where one thing is on account of another
1975 2, 9 | in respect of the same ~thing. But the will moves the
1976 2, 9 | Para. 1/3~I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by
1977 2, 9 | way of object. Now, that a thing appear to ~be good and fitting,
1978 2, 9 | condition, ~either of the thing proposed, or of the one
1979 2, 9 | variously ~disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being
1980 2, 9 | would follow that the ~same thing is at once moved immediately
1981 2, 9 | will and not will the same thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[9] A[4]
1982 2, 9 | something to move a ~natural thing, without being the cause
1983 2, 9 | without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that ~alone,
1984 2, 9 | some way the cause of a thing's nature, can cause a ~natural
1985 2, 9 | natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards
1986 2, 10 | which is natural is in a thing always: as "being ~hot"
1987 2, 10 | nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is ~referred
1988 2, 10 | said to be natural to a thing ~which befits it in respect
1989 2, 10 | which of ~itself is in a thing. Now all things that do
1990 2, 10 | themselves belong to ~the thing in which they are, are reduced
1991 2, 10 | belongs of ~itself to that thing, as to their principle.
1992 2, 10 | of whatever belongs to a ~thing, be a natural principle.
1993 2, 10 | which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded ~
1994 2, 10 | cause. Because in every thing, being ~itself, which is
1995 2, 10 | every nature there is one thing corresponding, ~proportionate,
1996 2, 10 | intellect, some one ~general thing corresponds to it, naturally
1997 2, 10 | corresponds some one general thing, which is the ~true, or
1998 2, 10 | true, or being, or "what a thing is." And under good in general
1999 2, 10 | tend to one and the same thing from ~various points of
2000 2, 10 | various parts of the ~soul, a thing appears to him otherwise
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