Part, Question

2001   2, 10  |              whatever God does in a ~thing is natural to it," as Augustine
2002   2, 10  |          Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing
2003   2, 10  |              not determinate to one ~thing, but having an indifferent
2004   2, 10  |     determine it of necessity to one thing, but its ~movement remains
2005   2, 10  |           doing of something ~by the thing which He moves, but also
2006   2, 10  |        fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would
2007   2, 10  |              2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it
2008   2, 10  |              something becoming to a thing, ~according as God wishes
2009   2, 10  |          wish to be natural to each ~thing - that it be subject to
2010   2, 11  |              forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. ~Therefore
2011   2, 11  |             hinders one and the same thing from belonging, ~under different
2012   2, 11  |         sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either ~simply or
2013   2, 11  |           sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as ~the
2014   2, 11  |        possession." But so long as a thing is not ~had, there is joy,
2015   2, 11  |        possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession. ~
2016   2, 12  |            mover and the movement of thing ~moved, tend to something.
2017   2, 12  |             that the movement of the thing moved tends ~to anything,
2018   2, 12  |             the same time direct one thing to two ends: so that one
2019   2, 12  |          fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is
2020   2, 12  |            the reasons for which one thing is better ~than another
2021   2, 12  |             purposes: wherefore one ~thing can be chosen in preference
2022   2, 12  |          means are one and ~the same thing. For when I say: "I wish
2023   2, 12  |             The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that end, ~
2024   2, 12  |           imply the ordaining of one thing to ~another, as intention
2025   2, 13  |          choice is the taking of one thing in preference to ~another
2026   2, 13  |        determinate to one particular thing, ~according to the order
2027   2, 13  |         although determinate ~to one thing in general, viz. the good,
2028   2, 13  |              Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is ~
2029   2, 13  |        certain discrimination of one thing from ~another. And this
2030   2, 13  |          irrational animal takes one thing in preference to ~another,
2031   2, 13  |        naturally determinate to that thing. ~Wherefore as soon as an
2032   2, 13  |            implies preference of one thing to another. But ~just as
2033   2, 13  |             is either an action or a thing. And when the end ~is a
2034   2, 13  |               And when the end ~is a thing, some human action must
2035   2, 13  |             far as man ~produces the thing which is the end, as the
2036   2, 13  |         fashion, uses or enjoys the ~thing which is the end; thus for
2037   2, 13  |            be either an action; or a thing, with some action intervening ~
2038   2, 13  |         whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts
2039   2, 13  |             whenever we speak of one thing ~being chosen in preference
2040   2, 13  |              Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But
2041   2, 13  |            the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an
2042   2, 13  |               to the attainment of a thing; for the movement of the
2043   2, 13  |             is from the ~soul to the thing. Consequently the perfect
2044   2, 13  |           would will [vellet] such a thing, were ~it possible. But
2045   2, 13  |             decide whether a certain thing is possible; but in ~each
2046   2, 14  |              1/1~Reply OBJ 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one
2047   2, 14  |             as to whether a certain ~thing is possible to us, depends
2048   2, 15  |           kind of inclination to the thing itself, ~the application
2049   2, 15  |              appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it ~cleaves
2050   2, 15  |              direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, ~in
2051   2, 15  |            it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more ~properly
2052   2, 15  |            in a movement towards the thing, but rather the reverse,
2053   2, 15  | determination of the appetite to one thing. But the ~appetite of irrational
2054   2, 15  |        animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore ~consent is to
2055   2, 15  |          movement to some particular thing. And hence it is that the
2056   2, 15  |             apply it to this or that thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[15] A[
2057   2, 15  |            appetite to ~a particular thing is merely passive: whereas
2058   2, 15  |          that ~on account of which a thing is such is still more such.
2059   2, 15  |            we approve of doing that ~thing; but choice according as
2060   2, 16  |            answer that, The use of a thing implies the application
2061   2, 16  |              the application of that thing ~to an operation: hence
2062   2, 16  |        operation to which we apply a thing is called ~its use; thus
2063   2, 16  |         Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will ~
2064   2, 16  |         sense to use is to refer one thing to another.~Aquin.: SMT
2065   2, 16  |             animal can make use of a thing."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[16] A[
2066   2, 16  |            who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something
2067   2, 16  |           use: because to direct one thing to another is ~an act of
2068   2, 16  |              the application of ~one thing to another. Now that which
2069   2, 16  |             signifies sometimes the ~thing itself, and sometimes the
2070   2, 16  |     attainment or possession of that thing ~(thus the miser's end is
2071   2, 16  |        speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the ~possession
2072   2, 16  |              relations: ~one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the
2073   2, 16  |           the end; the other, of the thing ~chosen, in respect of that
2074   2, 16  |              twofold relation to the thing willed. One, ~according
2075   2, 16  |               One, ~according as the thing willed is, in a way, in
2076   2, 16  |           proportion or order to the thing willed. Wherefore those
2077   2, 16  |    imperfectly. ~Now every imperfect thing tends to perfection. And
2078   2, 16  |         relation of the will to ~the thing willed.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
2079   2, 16  |               Body Para. 2/2~Now the thing willed is not only the end,
2080   2, 16  |            to the realization of the thing ~willed. Wherefore it is
2081   2, 16  |         after the absolute; but the ~thing to which relation is referred
2082   2, 16  |       nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice of ~
2083   2, 17  |             for he who judges that a thing ~should be done, does not
2084   2, 17  |             united to the act of the thing used; for one does not use
2085   2, 17  |    simultaneous ~with the act of the thing to which the command is
2086   2, 17  |             iii, 2) that "where one ~thing is by reason of another,
2087   2, 17  |            mover ~and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys.
2088   2, 17  |            it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But it
2089   2, 17  |           its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.~Aquin.:
2090   2, 18  |              as it is in act. Now a ~thing is evil, not according as
2091   2, 18  |          unity: ~whereas every other thing has its proper fulness of
2092   2, 18  |           very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness
2093   2, 18  |             OBJ 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain ~
2094   2, 18  |            object of any action is a thing. But "evil is ~not in things,
2095   2, 18  |               But ~the goodness of a thing is not from its matter,
2096   2, 18  |               fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness
2097   2, 18  |             to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as
2098   2, 18  |       species. And just as a natural thing ~has its species from its
2099   2, 18  |       primary ~goodness of a natural thing is derived from its form,
2100   2, 18  |             evil is when a generated thing does not realize its ~specific
2101   2, 18  |             the matter "of which" (a thing is made), ~but the matter "
2102   2, 18  |              that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its ~substance,
2103   2, 18  |       fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial ~
2104   2, 18  |              it its species; since a thing derives much from ~supervening
2105   2, 18  |             is good predicated of a ~thing both in respect of its essential
2106   2, 18  |             if the end ~is good, the thing is good, and if the end
2107   2, 18  |              if the end be evil, the thing also is ~evil."~Aquin.:
2108   2, 18  |              just as the being of a ~thing depends on the agent, and
2109   2, 18  |           form, so the goodness of a thing ~depends on its end. Hence
2110   2, 18  |              For ~that is good for a thing which suits it in regard
2111   2, 18  |           But it is impossible for a thing to be ~contained under another
2112   2, 18  |           the proper species of that thing; because the same thing
2113   2, 18  |              thing; because the same thing cannot be ~contained in
2114   2, 18  |              OBJ 1: One and the same thing, considered in its substance,
2115   2, 18  |     superadded to the substance, one thing ~can be contained under
2116   2, 18  |            one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as ~to its perfume,
2117   2, 18  |          Therefore there is not such thing as an ~action that is indifferent
2118   2, 18  |              1/1~OBJ 3: Further, one thing is not in several species.
2119   2, 18  |              of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy ~place is a
2120   2, 18  |         nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process ~of nature
2121   2, 18  |            which is accidental ~to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference
2122   2, 18  |           being more or less white a thing is not changed in ~regard
2123   2, 19  |          Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
2124   2, 19  |            is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore
2125   2, 19  |            OBJ 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a
2126   2, 19  |              is, such does it make a thing to be. But ~the object of
2127   2, 19  |              every genus, the more a thing is first, the more ~simple
2128   2, 19  |              will depend on some one thing; while the goodness and ~
2129   2, 19  |          Body Para. 2/2~Now that one thing which is the principle in
2130   2, 19  |             act depends on that ~one thing alone, which of itself causes
2131   2, 19  |            in the act; and that one ~thing is the object, and not the
2132   2, 19  |     circumstance is referred to ~the thing willed. And thus the act
2133   2, 19  |             circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to say,
2134   2, 19  |          eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule and one ~
2135   2, 19  |              is homogeneous with the thing measured" ~(Metaph. x, 1).
2136   2, 19  |              1/1~Reply OBJ 1: To one thing there are not several proximate
2137   2, 19  |              is homogeneous with the thing measured; ~a remote measure
2138   2, 19  |           from the ~very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason
2139   2, 19  |      Consequently in order ~that the thing to which the will tends
2140   2, 19  |            object of the will is one thing, and the end intended is ~
2141   2, 19  |         intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore
2142   2, 19  |              of the goodness of ~the thing willed: for instance, when
2143   2, 19  |       depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as stated above (
2144   2, 19  |             if he ~intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
2145   2, 19  |          Divine will, as regards the thing willed?~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
2146   2, 19  |          Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot will
2147   2, 19  |            the Divine will as to the thing willed.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[
2148   2, 19  |            will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow
2149   2, 19  |           the Divine will, as to the thing ~willed.~Aquin.: SMT FS
2150   2, 19  |             to conform it, as to the thing willed.~(3) Moreover, opposition
2151   2, 19  |              Divine ~will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.~
2152   2, 19  |       proposed by the reason. ~Now a thing may be considered in various
2153   2, 19  |              if a man's will wills a thing to be, according as it ~
2154   2, 19  |         another man, who ~wills that thing not to be, according as
2155   2, 19  |  proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under
2156   2, 19  |            particular aspect, ~which thing God wills not, under a universal
2157   2, 19  |              they wish a ~particular thing to be or not to be.~Aquin.:
2158   2, 19  |             the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed ~
2159   2, 19  |            to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is ~
2160   2, 19  |     apprehension of ~some particular thing, comes to a thing from God
2161   2, 19  |         particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its efficient
2162   2, 19  |         Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good,
2163   2, 19  |              as to the reason of the thing willed. But ~we know not
2164   2, 19  |           every one will see in each thing that he ~wills, the relation
2165   2, 19  |          wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that
2166   2, 19  |             aspect of reason of the ~thing willed, wills what God wills,
2167   2, 19  |             in the point of the very thing willed; because the will ~
2168   2, 19  |             aspect, one ~man wills a thing which another wills not.
2169   2, 20  |              to be good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or ~evil,
2170   2, 20  |             A[6], ad 1), that ~for a thing to be evil, one single defect
2171   2, 20  |             OBJ 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect;
2172   2, 20  |            and formal element is one thing. Therefore ~there is but
2173   2, 20  |            to something else, that a thing is ~good merely from being
2174   2, 20  |             they combine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated ~
2175   2, 20  |              1/1~Reply OBJ 3: When a thing is derived by one thing
2176   2, 20  |              thing is derived by one thing from another, as from ~a
2177   2, 20  |            in both: thus when a ~hot thing heats, the heat of the heater
2178   2, 20  |       distinct from the heat of the ~thing heated, although it be the
2179   2, 20  |             specifically. But when a thing is ~derived from one thing
2180   2, 20  |           thing is ~derived from one thing from another, according
2181   2, 20  |              is the ~addition of one thing to another. Therefore the
2182   2, 20  |          virtually in actions. Now a thing is ~judged to be good or
2183   2, 20  |         because we do not judge of a thing ~according to that which
2184   2, 20  |            On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of
2185   2, 20  |            On the contrary, The same thing cannot be the subject of
2186   2, 20  |              that, Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far
2187   2, 21  |             is the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not
2188   2, 21  |          Para. 1/1~Reply OBJ 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by
2189   2, 21  |              produce a good or a bad thing, ~just as he lists. Therefore
2190   2, 21  |           guilt are one and the same thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[21] A[
2191   2, 21  |              an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to ~produce
2192   2, 22  |           lost is unsuitable to ~the thing: thus when an animal's body
2193   2, 22  |            proper acceptation. For a thing is said to be passive from
2194   2, 22  |             to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable ~
2195   2, 22  |          that when a more excellent ~thing is generated from a less
2196   2, 22  |          when ~from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated.
2197   2, 22  |               the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power
2198   2, 22  |              power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but
2199   2, 22  |             of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has
2200   2, 22  |     principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, the more intense ~
2201   2, 22  |              Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends
2202   2, 22  |               to which ~the nearer a thing approaches the more light
2203   2, 22  |        defect. Wherefore the less a ~thing recedes from that which
2204   2, 22  |              because it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality. ~
2205   2, 24  |             accidental ~belongs to a thing's species, it seems that
2206   2, 25  |          that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer ~look upon
2207   2, 25  |            is looked ~upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done
2208   2, 25  |      movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. ~Therefore
2209   2, 25  |             takes place first in the thing that ~tends to the end.
2210   2, 25  |             1~Reply OBJ 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for "
2211   2, 25  |        proportion, in so far as ~one thing, from the very fact of its
2212   2, 25  |             1~OBJ 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end,
2213   2, 25  |           the contrary, The nearer a thing is to the first, the more
2214   2, 26  |             connaturalness ~with the thing to which it tends, and may
2215   2, 26  |           things"; since each single thing ~has a connaturalness with
2216   2, 26  |           dilection denote the same ~thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[26] A[
2217   2, 26  |               7) that "it is not one thing ~to speak of love, and another
2218   2, 26  |      referring in a way, to the same thing: ~viz. love, dilection,
2219   2, 26  |          Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another
2220   2, 26  |  Consequently the love with which a ~thing is loved, that it may have
2221   2, 26  |              the ~love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be
2222   2, 27  |     complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, ~and to everything,
2223   2, 27  |              and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin
2224   2, 27  |   acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to ~acknowledge one's faults,
2225   2, 27  |            it is ~due to love that a thing is sought. But some things
2226   2, 27  |          distinctly all that is in a thing, such as ~its parts, powers,
2227   2, 27  |    appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore
2228   2, 27  |           perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as ~it
2229   2, 27  |             it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more ~than it is
2230   2, 27  |         cause of love. For the same ~thing is not the cause of contraries.
2231   2, 27  |            likeness arises from each thing having the same quality
2232   2, 27  |             likeness arises from one thing having potentially ~and
2233   2, 27  |          form: thus two men ~are one thing in the species of humanity,
2234   2, 27  |            and two white men are one thing ~in whiteness. Hence the
2235   2, 27  |           have no hope of ~getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly
2236   2, 27  |           kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. ~
2237   2, 27  |            OBJ 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords,
2238   2, 27  |            Reply OBJ 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love
2239   2, 27  |            presupposes love for that thing. ~But desire of one thing
2240   2, 27  |            thing. ~But desire of one thing can be the cause of another
2241   2, 27  |              be the cause of another thing's being loved; ~thus he
2242   2, 28  |             which is good in a good ~thing always" (speaking of himself,
2243   2, 28  |              intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But
2244   2, 28  |  apprehension ~of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For
2245   2, 28  |           lover. For when we love a ~thing, by desiring it, we apprehend
2246   2, 28  |        Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, ~through
2247   2, 28  |          effect of love is that the ~thing itself which is loved, is,
2248   2, 28  |                as when we desire one thing on account of another, or
2249   2, 28  |       beloved. For nothing hinders a thing ~from being both container
2250   2, 28  |             to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other ~
2251   2, 28  |     perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to ~that which
2252   2, 29  |             the truth?~(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal
2253   2, 29  |             OBJ 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time
2254   2, 29  |              and ~evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to
2255   2, 29  |          evident, that just as each ~thing is naturally attuned and
2256   2, 29  |             1~Reply OBJ 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good,
2257   2, 29  |             is not ~truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil,
2258   2, 29  |            different things the same thing may be lovable or ~hateful:
2259   2, 29  |           owing to one and the same ~thing being naturally suitable
2260   2, 29  |            naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable
2261   2, 29  |            owing to one and the same thing being ~apprehended by one
2262   2, 29  |              should consider in each thing, ~what agrees with it, before
2263   2, 29  |             which disagrees: since a thing disagrees ~with another,
2264   2, 29  |         being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence
2265   2, 29  |              in respect of ~the same thing. But if taken in respect
2266   2, 29  |              that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary.
2267   2, 29  |          contrary. Thus ~love of one thing is the cause of one's hating
2268   2, 29  |              than ~hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more
2269   2, 29  |              he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant
2270   2, 29  |              But that which is in a ~thing naturally, is always in
2271   2, 29  |            in itself, is a desirable thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[29] A[
2272   2, 29  |              1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal ~
2273   2, 29  |           the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an object of universal
2274   2, 29  |        hatred is also directed to a ~thing in general; for everybody
2275   2, 29  |              ascribed: for it is one thing to consider ~the universal
2276   2, 29  |            universally: because this thing, by reason of its ~common
2277   2, 29  |          hatred can be directed to a thing in general."~Aquin.: SMT
2278   2, 29  |                But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many,
2279   2, 30  |          simply movement towards the thing desired.~Aquin.: SMT FS
2280   2, 30  |          power alone. And to crave a thing ~under the aspect of something
2281   2, 30  |              pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways.
2282   2, 30  |             be ~natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it
2283   2, 30  |              1~Reply OBJ 1: The same thing that is the object of the
2284   2, 30  |         apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as suitable,
2285   2, 30  |        infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, ~
2286   2, 30  |             far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in
2287   2, 31  |              with the nature ~of the thing."~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[31] A[
2288   2, 31  |     establishing in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. ~with that
2289   2, 31  |             that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of
2290   2, 31  |              1: and therefore when a thing is ~established in its proper
2291   2, 31  |          Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and
2292   2, 31  |           Para. 1/2~I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways:
2293   2, 31  |      application to some ~particular thing, but also the intellectual
2294   2, 31  |        produced by ~the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly
2295   2, 31  |              outward ~accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates
2296   2, 31  |             the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, ~because
2297   2, 31  |           But it is natural to every thing to be ~established in its
2298   2, 31  |             1~OBJ 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as
2299   2, 31  |              in relation to some one thing - i.e. the reason.~Aquin.:
2300   2, 32  |          pleasure in looking ~upon a thing as our own, by reason of
2301   2, 32  |             with ~the operation of a thing already in existence. Now
2302   2, 32  |           perfect: when ~therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all
2303   2, 32  |             whole, change in ~such a thing is pleasant, so that one
2304   2, 32  |              And so whenever any one thing is made up ~of many, all
2305   2, 32  |            If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable;
2306   2, 32  |             OBJ 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries.
2307   2, 32  |          perceived in any way. Now a thing is present to ~us in two
2308   2, 32  |                i.e. according as the thing known ~is in the knower
2309   2, 32  |               i.e. according ~as one thing is in real conjunction of
2310   2, 32  |            Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being ~
2311   2, 32  |             Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its ~contrary:
2312   2, 32  |             hating one and ~the same thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[32] A[
2313   2, 32  |           greater the desire for the thing loved, ~the greater the
2314   2, 32  |           rejoices in comparing one ~thing with another, because comparison
2315   2, 32  |            because comparison of one thing with another is the ~proper
2316   2, 33  |             1~OBJ 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to
2317   2, 33  |            hinders one and the ~same thing from being attributed to
2318   2, 33  |             pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more ample in itself ~
2319   2, 33  |              the ~imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion
2320   2, 33  |             that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by ~clinging
2321   2, 33  |          Para. 1/1~OBJ 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary.
2322   2, 33  |          denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: ~because
2323   2, 33  |            may be on the part of the thing possessed, ~or on the part
2324   2, 33  |        possessor. On the part of the thing possessed, this ~happens
2325   2, 33  |            this ~happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous
2326   2, 33  |       happens when a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself,
2327   2, 33  |               is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in
2328   2, 33  |              than towards an ~absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances
2329   2, 33  |          that on "account of which a thing ~is"; but according as every
2330   2, 33  |             good which is added to a thing and completes ~it, can be
2331   2, 34  |            in the order of nature, a thing is said to be natural, if
2332   2, 34  |            natural repose, whereby a thing ~rests in that which agrees
2333   2, 34  |          unnatural repose, whereby a thing ~rests in that which disagrees
2334   2, 34  |            which ~is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is
2335   2, 34  |     generation: for the fact that ~a thing takes pleasure is due to
2336   2, 34  |              is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the ~use of
2337   2, 34  |         itself, and the ~use of that thing; thus the miser's end is
2338   2, 34  |            pleasure is not the first thing in the ~moral genus, for
2339   2, 34  |            because the goodness of a thing depends on its ~end. And
2340   2, 35  |            of the well-being of that thing which the soul, by making
2341   2, 35  |               thus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.~Aquin.:
2342   2, 35  |           that ~"weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it sometimes pleases
2343   2, 35  |             feel one's love for the ~thing, whose absence gives us
2344   2, 35  |            On the contrary, The same thing is not the cause of contraries.
2345   2, 35  |         contraries. But joy ~for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite
2346   2, 35  |              sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the same ~
2347   2, 35  |          e.g. to approach to a white thing, and ~to approach to a black
2348   2, 35  |               to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas
2349   2, 35  |       affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. ~"white" and "non-white";
2350   2, 35  |            contemplating but in the ~thing contemplated. Now it is
2351   2, 35  |           intense in the end, when a thing approaches the term that
2352   2, 35  |             opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to
2353   2, 35  |     Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt.
2354   2, 35  |           apprehended likeness of a ~thing: for a man is not inwardly
2355   2, 35  |         likeness ~itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents.
2356   2, 35  |        likeness represents. And this thing is ~all the more perfectly
2357   2, 35  |            added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus
2358   2, 35  |               2,3). But, secondly, a thing may be added to a genus,
2359   2, 35  |             species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a ~species
2360   2, 36  |             the absence of that same thing is the object of ~sorrow.
2361   2, 36  |            way, directed to the same thing under a contrary aspect.~
2362   2, 36  |             Because the good of each thing consists in a certain ~unity,
2363   2, 36  |              unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, the
2364   2, 36  |         which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither does ~
2365   2, 36  |              something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because
2366   2, 36  |            whatever is contrary to a thing's ~inclination does not
2367   2, 37  |            The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the ~entire
2368   2, 37  |       because it is natural for each thing to tend wholly ~to repel
2369   2, 37  |                Behold this self-same thing, ~that you were made sorrowful
2370   2, 37  |            instance, to mourn. Now a thing is improved ~by that which
2371   2, 37  |              on account of a certain thing, the more one strives to
2372   2, 37  |         reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair
2373   2, 37  |              from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover ~sorrow
2374   2, 38  |              the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it
2375   2, 38  |             First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep
2376   2, 38  |            the other. Now every like thing increases its like. ~Therefore
2377   2, 38  |             mind on the ~part of the thing contemplated: but on the
2378   2, 39  |           Para. 1/1~I answer that, A thing may be good or evil in two
2379   2, 39  |       appetite in good. Secondly, ~a thing is said to be good or evil,
2380   2, 39  |              14): "It is also a good thing that he ~sorrows for the
2381   2, 39  |            nature shuns, the harmful thing that ~causes pain. As regards
2382   2, 39  |        object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow is to be ~
2383   2, 39  |          chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii,
2384   2, 39  |              may be right to avoid a thing. ~First, because it should
2385   2, 39  |           unto penance." Secondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as ~
2386   2, 39  |            very evil is in ~itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone
2387   2, 39  |            the soul; while the worst thing in the ~body is pain. Therefore
2388   2, 39  |          That which harms the better thing is worse than that which ~
2389   2, 39  |               harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because
2390   2, 40  |        Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible to
2391   2, 40  |              confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith,
2392   2, 40  |              movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in
2393   2, 40  |              to get, but also on the thing by whose power he ~hopes
2394   2, 40  |              2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can
2395   2, 40  |            Reply OBJ 3: Although the thing which is future does not
2396   2, 40  |            to hope. Because "to ~one thing there is one contrary" (
2397   2, 40  |             seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and ~despair do
2398   2, 40  |              do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards the
2399   2, 40  |              also a ~recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its
2400   2, 40  |            to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a ~cause of hope,
2401   2, 40  |           help one to judge truly ~a thing to be impossible. Wherefore
2402   2, 40  |        efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them. ~Wherefore
2403   2, 40  |         shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and consequently
2404   2, 41  |     considering a great and unwonted thing, whether ~good or evil:
2405   2, 42  |            to be ~above another is a thing to be feared." But this
2406   2, 42  |          feared." But this is a good thing. ~Therefore good is the
2407   2, 42  |            privation of ~good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact
2408   2, 42  |              which it tends, and the thing through which there is a
2409   2, 42  |             of the distance, ~such a thing is considered as though
2410   2, 42  |     difficulty ceases in so far as a thing is subject to ~the will.
2411   2, 42  |             himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so ~
2412   2, 42  |            it does not follow that a thing flies ~from itself, or that
2413   2, 42  |           the ~more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence
2414   2, 42  |            reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when seen
2415   2, 42  |           says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which ~lasts long is no
2416   2, 42  |      accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length of
2417   2, 43  |           For that which ~leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear
2418   2, 43  |              form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form,
2419   2, 43  |         cause of ~the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object,
2420   2, 43  |            apprehension of that good thing; while its cause by way
2421   2, 43  |       renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, ~
2422   2, 44  |             Q[41], A[2]). But that a thing be difficult to repel is
2423   2, 44  |             of repelling the harmful thing that ~causes pain but its
2424   2, 44  |           for counsel. ~For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel,
2425   2, 45  |             1~OBJ 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But
2426   2, 45  |              1/1~Reply OBJ 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there
2427   2, 45  |        respects nothing prevents one thing having ~several contraries.
2428   2, 45  |              bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the
2429   2, 46  |           Para. 1/2~I answer that, A thing is said to be general in
2430   2, 46  |      apprehensive power apprehends a thing in ~two ways. First, by
2431   2, 46  |          Para. 1/1~OBJ 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the
2432   2, 46  |             considered: namely, ~the thing desired, and the intensity
2433   2, 46  |             of the desire. As to the thing ~desired, anger has more
2434   2, 46  |             and this may refer to a ~thing in general or in particular.
2435   2, 47  |             very great interest in a thing, we look upon ~it as our
2436   2, 47  |              the more we think of ~a thing the more is it fixed in
2437   2, 48  |              everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell ~
2438   2, 48  |             and rejoice at the same ~thing; he grieves for the wrong
2439   2, 49  |        inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something;
2440   2, 49  |             inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] ~
2441   2, 49  |              be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard ~
2442   2, 49  |         regard to any quality: for a thing happens to be well ~or ill
2443   2, 49  |             qualities, some regard a thing in the ~point of its being
2444   2, 49  |       quality: while others regard a thing which is in act; ~and this
2445   2, 49  |        species of quality whether a ~thing be well or ill disposed,
2446   2, 49  |          take into account whether a thing be done with ease ~or difficulty;
2447   2, 49  |         regard ~to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species
2448   2, 49  |           itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause
2449   2, 49  |              end and the cause why a thing is ~made (Phys. ii, text.
2450   2, 49  |              mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has ~the aspect
2451   2, 49  |          relation to the nature of a thing, with regard to its suitability
2452   2, 49  |       unsuitable to the nature of ~a thing, belong to habits or dispositions:
2453   2, 49  |         suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat ~
2454   2, 49  |       suitability to the nature of a thing, ~concern health. And in
2455   2, 49  |           put in the definition of a thing, belongs ~to it essentially.
2456   2, 49  |            imply some ~relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it
2457   2, 49  |           unsuitable ~thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the end
2458   2, 49  |              to the very nature of a thing, but also, ~consequently,
2459   2, 49  |           implies a relation to the ~thing's nature. If therefore the
2460   2, 49  |            therefore the nature of a thing, in which the habit ~is,
2461   2, 49  |              as stated above. But a ~thing is well or ill disposed
2462   2, 49  |            in respect of its form a ~thing is good, even as it is a
2463   2, 49  |              greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in the ~nature
2464   2, 49  |         disposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation
2465   2, 49  |        reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed
2466   2, 49  |         disposed thereto. ~Now for a thing to need to be disposed to
2467   2, 49  |             the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the ~subject
2468   2, 50  |           and remissness. For when a thing receives heat in ~this only
2469   2, 50  |             they are ordained to one thing, even as nature is; but ~
2470   2, 50  |            Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the
2471   2, 50  |            thus identified with each thing," that is, when it is ~reduced
2472   2, 50  |          they are determinate to one thing. But the will, ~by reason
2473   2, 51  |               1/7~I answer that, One thing can be natural to another
2474   2, 51  |           the actual likeness of the thing known: whence it ~would
2475   2, 51  |              1/1~OBJ 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused
2476   2, 51  |              1~Reply OBJ 2: The same thing, and in the same respect,
2477   2, 51  |               but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by itself
2478   2, 51  |              like nature to the same thing, in the majority of cases;
2479   2, 52  |              corporeal quantities, a thing is ~said to be great, according
2480   2, 52  |              also in forms, we say a thing is ~great because it is
2481   2, 52  |          subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according
2482   2, 52  |          more or less, but the ~just thing. Aristotle alludes to this
2483   2, 52  |          that, in respect of which a thing receives its species, must
2484   2, 52  |            whatever attains to ~that thing, is contained under the
2485   2, 52  |             We may observe the same ~thing in health; for a body attains
2486   2, 52  |            these can there be such a thing as more or less. Whence
2487   2, 52  |           vii, text. 15) that when a thing receives form ~and shape,
2488   2, 52  |              said, that from which a thing receives its species must ~
2489   2, 52  |          that ~was not hot, when the thing was less hot." Therefore,
2490   2, 52  |              color is changed when a thing from being pale becomes
2491   2, 52  |             same form (as when a hot thing is added to another, or
2492   2, 52  |             to another, or one white thing to ~another). But in either
2493   2, 52  |            more white or a ~more hot thing, but a greater white or
2494   2, 52  |           but a greater white or hot thing.~Aquin.: SMT FS Q[52] A[
2495   2, 53  |              habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is not corrupted. ~
2496   2, 53  |          that while the nature ~of a thing cannot in any way be taken
2497   2, 53  |             way be taken away from a thing, a habit is ~removed, though
2498   2, 53  |       quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed either wholly
2499   2, 53  |             1/1~OBJ 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident,
2500   2, 53  |              applicable to the ~same thing. Now increase and decrease